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ABSTRACT
BENEATH THE SURFACE:
AMERICAN CULTURE AND SUBMARINE WARFARE
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
by Matthew Robert McGrew
August 2011
Cultural perceptions guided the American use of submarines during the twentieth
century. Feared as an evil weapon during the First World War, guarded as a dirty secret
during the Second World War, and heralded as the weapon of democracy during the Cold
War, the American submarine story reveals the overwhelming influence of civilian
culture over martial practices. The following study examines the roles that powerful
political and military elites, newspaper editors and Hollywood executives, and ordinary
citizens – equal players in a game larger than themselves – assumed throughout the
evolution of submerged warfare from 1914 to 1991. In each period, cultural discourse
about the vessels propelled the on-the-ground realities of implementing a practical, yet
acceptable, approach to an often misunderstood weapon system.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On a bright, clear morning in October 1990, a crowd of political and military
leaders gathered together in Georgia with members of the press and anxious onlookers to
catch a glimpse of the United States Navy’s latest Trident-missile submarine. Christened
West Virginia a year earlier by Mrs. Erma Byrd, wife of the Democratic senator from the
ship’s namesake state, the submarine was the picture of patriotic pride. The vessel sat tall
in the water, imposing and powerful despite the ornate bunts and streamers of red, white,
and blue that decorated her decks. A military band played in the background as welldressed gentlemen and ladies mingled with the West Virginia’s officers and crew.
Underscoring the grandeur of the occasion was the clear presence of high security on land
and sea marked by armed sentries and high-speed boats with mounted machine guns.
Amidst the whirlwind of socialite banter and military ceremony stood a young
family of little or no consequence to the crowd that surrounded them. Arrayed in their
middle-class Sunday-Best, the father and mother flanked both sides of their twelve-yearold son, staring in wonder at the mighty spectacle that unfolded before them. A chance
invitation from a well-placed friend had brought them from their home outside a small
town nestled among the West Virginia hills.
For the family, it was indeed a special day. After a private tour of the submarine,
the proud parents snapped photographs of their son shaking hands with the ship’s master
– the boy’s gaze directed at the shiny medals that covered the captain’s chest. Later in
the day, the wife took care as she selected and purchased three navy-blue sweatshirts that
bore the ship’s emblem. With each garment came a small note that read, “Because of
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your generosity, a member of the crew will receive a shirt just like this one.” The name
West Virginia had deepened the family’s sense of state and national pride, but this small
act of kindness provided an intimate connection to the men who manned the submarine.1
Throughout the twentieth century, American culture dictated the country’s
policies regarding submarine warfare. The scene at the West Virginia’s commissioning is
but a snapshot, isolating one moment in the progression of ever-changing cultural
perceptions. Broadly speaking, Americans experienced the realities of submarine warfare
by filtering events through three dominant perceptions: as victims, as aggressors, and as
noble defenders. In the First World War, the country reeled in the wake of German
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (USW) that took the lives of innocent bystanders. From
the interwar period through the end of the Second World War, Americans accepted
submarines as part of the country’s navy, but adopted a hear no evil, see no evil, speak no
evil approach to the vessels – particularly during the country’s own prosecution of USW
against Japan during the Pacific War. When the possibility of Soviet nuclear aggression
threatened the United States during the Cold War, submarines rose to new prominence as
protectors of freedom that employed weapons of deterrence. In each period, culture
defined submarines and their potential uses.
Although connections between perceptions of submarines in the Cold War and the
earlier world wars remain unexplored, the discrepancy between First and Second World
War US Naval policy has not gone unnoticed by military historians. Author J.E. Talbott
believes that America’s use of the vessels between 1941 and 1945 represents “one of the
ironies that has marked the history of modern warfare.”2 Yet, despite the irony, many of

1

From WHF Papers and Photographs, private collection.
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the arguments about submarine warfare advanced since 1945 have been simplistic.
Samuel Eliot Morison’s sweeping, fifteen-volume naval history of the Second World
War, for example, concluded that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had “absolved the
United States from observing any rule restricting methods of naval warfare…”3 Morison
gave birth to what this study refers to as the Retaliatory School – the belief that the
change from submarine victims to aggressive submarine users occurred overnight due
entirely to Pearl Harbor. Subsequent studies by Theodore Roscoe (1949), W.J. Holmes
(1966), and Ernest Andrade (1971) reinforced the Morison thesis of retaliation.4 Even
Clay Blair’s Silent Victory, heralded as the quintessential work on America’s submarine
war, subscribes to Morison’s thesis.5 All historians who have followed Morison’s lead
point to two pieces of evidence they claim proves the retaliation argument: a remark
made by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner on 7 December 1941, and testimony offered
at Nuremberg by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Both men stated matter-of-factly that
the commencement of USW by the United States came as a response to Pearl Harbor.6
Over the past thirty years, as the US Navy declassified more official pre-war and
wartime documents, historians have grappled with the validity of the Retaliatory School’s
thesis. One of the earliest published refutations of Morison’s argument, J.E. Talbott’s
2
J.E. Talbott, “Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The US Navy and the
Submarine, 1917-1941,” Naval War College Review 37, (May/June 1984): 53-71.
3

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. IV,
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 190.
4

Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis: US Naval
Institute Press, 1949); W.J. Holmse, Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War
in the Pacific (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); Ernest Andrade, Jr., “Submarine Policy in the United
States Navy, 1919-1941,” Military Affairs 35, no. 2 (April 1971): 50-6.
5

Clay Blair, Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott,

6

Talbott, “Weapons Development,” 54.

1975).
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1984 article on weapons development and war planning, dismissed the premise of
retaliation outright. After considering the connections between US policy, naval strategy,
and weapons development, Talbott argued that “unrestricted submarine warfare was the
probable outcome of decisions made as early as 1919 and pursued throughout the
interwar period.”7 Talbott went on to write that the issuance of orders for USW on 7
December “seems less a decision than a foregone conclusion.”8 Not so polemic as
Talbott’s article, Edward Miller’s ground-breaking examination of war planning during
the interwar period, though adherent in part to the Retaliatory School, did note that talk of
implementing a USW policy began filtering through official communications prior to the
Pearl Harbor attack.9
More recently, naval historians have become less definitive in their arguments
regarding USW than scholars like Morison and Talbott. Craig Felker’s 2007
investigation of the navy’s strategic exercises between 1923 and 1940 reads like the work
of an author who wants to have his cake and eat it too.10 On one hand, Felker argues that,
even on the eve of the Second World War, the US Navy continued to ignore the strategic
importance of submarines. However, Felker also notes that US submariners had become,
through simulated fleet engagements, just as aggressive as the main battle wagons,
making the move to USW after Pearl Harbor “but a small operational leap.”11 Just as

7

Ibid., 56.

8

Ibid., 67.

9

Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1991), 320.
10

Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007).
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ambiguous in its stance regarding the Retaliatory School as Felker’s work is Joel Ira
Holwitt’s 2009 Execute Against Japan.12 Though Holwitt presents readers with a
carefully nuanced account of the United States’ move away from the long-standing
Freedom of the Seas policy toward the 7 December order to conduct USW against Japan,
his work ultimately has two contradictory themes. First, Execute Against Japan argues
that because the United States had no serious intention of using USW, the navy failed to
develop tactics for submarines that were appropriate to the realities of commerce raiding.
The failure, contends Holwitt, created cautious submariners who bungled the initial
months of the USW campaign – an argument which is a mainstay of the Retaliatory
School’s thesis. Holwitt’s thorough archival research, however, also unearthed material
that indicated the navy’s predilection for submarine-based commerce raiding vis-à-vis
USW ran far deeper than previously believed. Execute Against Japan demonstrates the
biggest problem facing historians researching this topic: how to reconcile two
contradictory theses supported by such substantial archival evidence? The following
study argues that the use of culture to examine American submarine warfare reveals a
larger trend of perception-driven policies that span the entirety of the twentieth century.
In other areas of historical inquiry, authors facing a multitude of solid, albeit
exclusive, arguments for causality have found that such opposing forces often share roots
in the unspoken cultural assumptions of society. Most notably, Kristin Hoganson’s
Fighting for American Manhood used culture, specifically assumptions about gender, to

11
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Ibid., 74.

Joel Ira Holwitt, Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine
Warfare (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009).
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reexamine the causes of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.13 Despite
the fact that “culture might only complicate our understanding of historical causality, for
it is never determinative,” Hoganson grounded the known causes of war within the larger
context of contemporary culture.14 Through this process, the author argued that
seemingly divergent motives for war stemmed from cultural beliefs and perceptions of
gender. Similarly, Noel Perrin’s explanation as to why Japan effectively gave up the gun
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries depends largely on an understanding of a
culture rooted in traditional Samurai swordsmanship.15 The studies of both Hoganson
and Perrin reveal that an understanding of the broader cultural context that frame military
decisions can yield fruitful results. It is with this premise that this study begins.
Because historians rarely agree on a single transmitter of culture, the phenomenon
itself, as it appears in this study, deserves attention. In this matter, the recent work of
European historians offers some useful conceptualizations. Carl Schorske’s study of finde- siècle Vienna uses contemporary architecture, music, intellectual theories, and art as a
lens through which he examines political history.16 Viennese elites, contends the author,
created cultural representations of their own political perceptions and realities exclusively
for an audience of their social peers. Conversely, Vanessa Schwartz broadens this rather
limited use of culture in her work on Parisian mass culture of the same time period by

13

Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the
Spanish-American and Philippine American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
14

Ibid., 2-14.

15

Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879 (Boston:
Nonpareil Books, 1979).
16

1981).

Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books,
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finding the mass audience.17 The emergence of what she labels as “spectacular realities”
(morgue viewings, panoramas, and early cinema) throughout fin-de-siecle Paris gave the
city’s diverse social classes a common place to mingle and merge into a greater mass
culture. Additionally, Schwartz argues that the seemingly separate experiences of both
the spectacles’ creators and audiences were in fact inextricably connected to one another.
In both cases, the author’s conceptualization of culture engages the issue of
agency, yet alone, neither approach fully satisfies the needs presented by a study of
submarine culture in America. Therefore, this study employs a synthesis of the two
approaches, effectively democratizing agency between the masses and individual actors.
Schorske restricts creative and consumptive agency to the culture of Viennese elites. If
applied to this study as is, his approach would discount the role of average Americans in
creating and shaping cultural discourse. Similarly, a strict application of Schwartz’s
methodology, while giving agency to America’s masses, would limit the ability of
smaller, more powerful groups of individuals to influence discourse at any given time.
Jeffrey Verhey’s methodological approach in The Spirit of 1914 lends itself well to such a
synthesis advocated in the following study.18 In examining the creation and manipulation
of a mythical, unified pro-war atmosphere throughout Germany during the July Crisis of
1914, Verhey’s argument rests upon evidence found in the editorial stances of
contemporary newspapers. The ability of the press to both create and reflect popular
opinion enables access to both the mass audience and the individual.

17

Vanessa R. Schwartz, Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-De-Siècle Paris
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
18

Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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As the culturally imagined identity of submariners changed during the twentieth
century, so too did the American discourse of submarine warfare. In this vein, a
theoretical model constructed around the fictional Nautilus from Jules Verne’s 20,000
Leagues Under the Sea provides a means for understanding the cultural discourse about
submarines in twentieth-century America. Set in the 1870s, the novel begins with a
flurry of reports that some unspeakable sea creature has attacked numerous ships making
trans-Atlantic voyages. The book’s narrator, Professor Aronnax, is a marine biologist by
training who agrees to accompany the United States navy on a “monster hunt.” Aronnax
falls overboard along with his research assistant and Canadian harpooner Ned Land,
when the sea beast attacks his ship. Drifting on the open ocean, the three men find
themselves beside their quarry, only to discover that the monster is a ship. Taken aboard
by the vessel’s crew, Aronnax and the others become the captives of the Nautilus and her
mysterious master, Captain Nemo.
The perception of Verne’s Nautilus remains fluid throughout the entire work,
implying that the ship’s character depends on the shifting qualities expressed by a living
being, namely her master, Captain Nemo. Without a captain or crew, Nautilus was an
inanimate hunk of metallurgy and posed no threat to society. With the revelation that the
supposed sea monster is actually a man-made craft, the narrator, Professor Aronnax,
concludes that the ship’s persons are “[n]o doubt some new sort of pirates, who explored
the sea in their own way.”19 Exclaiming that “it is an infamous shame” that “not one of
[the crew] ha[d] the politeness to answer” questions posed by the professor and his
companions, harpooner Ned Land shouts that the crew most certainly hailed “from the

19

Jules Verne, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1970), 39.
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land of rogues!”20 Continuing in his description of the ship, the professor makes repeated
references to the Nautilus as a prison. Yet after Captain Nemo formally introduces
himself and offers the prisoners “liberty” to wander about the submarine (though they are
never to leave), the reader, through the scientific eyes of Aronnax, becomes aware of the
scientific marvel that is Nautilus: a vessel powered entirely by electricity derived from
sea water.21
The creation and alteration of American submarine discourse depended on the
identity of those persons using the vessels. In the fictional example, the emotions
Nautilus evoked merely reflected that aspect of Nemo’s personality that Verne wished to
describe in a given passage. Near the book’s end, the mysterious captain becomes a
figure of compassion and devotion. After a band of giant squids kills the ship’s
lieutenant, the professor tells the reader that Nemo “gazed upon the sea that had
swallowed up one of his companions, and great tears gathered in his eyes.”22 Continuing
his description of life on board the ship, the professor provides an essential element to the
“Vernian” model of discourse creation:
Captain Nemo entered his room, and I saw him no more for
some time. But that he was sad and irresolute I could see
by the vessel, of which he was the soul, and which received
all his impressions. The Nautilus did not keep on in its
settled course; it floated about like a corpse at the will of
the waves. It went at random. [Nemo] could not tear
himself away from the scene of that last struggle, from this
sea that had devoured one of his men.23

20

Ibid., 43.

21

Ibid., 60-4.

22

Ibid., 271.

23

Ibid., 271-2.
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From this perspective, the connection between the discourse of submarines and the
perceived character of the individuals running them becomes inextricably connected.
Using the cultural identity of submariners as a determinant of discourse creation
and manipulation requires an acknowledgement that a cultural “audience” plays an
equally important role in the process. Similarly to Vanessa Schwartz, Modris Eksteins
argues that without the reaction of an audience, “spectacles” lose their meaning.24 The
“Vernian” model illustrates this relationship well. The civilized, scientific side of Nemo,
and consequently that of the Nautilus, only presents itself to Professor Aronnax, whose
own interests and cultural appetites allow room for the ship’s transformation from
“prison” to “marvel of the modern world.” In fact, the professor admits that Nemo
touched Arronax’s “weak point” by offering to share in the scientific findings afforded by
submarine exploration.25 It is only after this admission that the professor describes, in
extensive detail, the technological breakthroughs Nemo has achieved. Ned Land’s
perception, on the other hand, of the Nautilus as a “prison” only changes at times when
his personal fate and that of the ship intersect. Even then, it is arguable that Land only
suspends, rather than alters, his prior belief. Clearly, the ever-changing nature of
discourse depends on the variables associated with both the “viewer” and the “viewed.”
Though informative and enlightening, analyzing the creation and evolution of
cultural discourse through the use of the above model only tells one side of the submarine
story. A study of an imagined reality that ignores the factual reality implies through
omission that the two do not relate to one another. Kathleen Canning’s Languages of

24

Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989).
25

Verne, 20,000 Leagues, 52.

11
Labor and Gender, much like Jeffrey Verhey’s work, demonstrates that cultural
discourse and reality interact with and react to each other frequently.26 Simply put,
discourse derives from a given aspect of reality, the established discourse then informs
the actions and reactions of society to events, and the process continues indefinitely.
Based on this principle of interaction, this study will explore the points at which
American submarine discourse and reality intersect and diverge. The resulting
“culturally thick” description of American submarine warfare will place this subject in a
broader historical context than allowed by more “traditional” military history studies. To
that end, the study uses a wide array of primary sources – ranging from print media to
personal correspondence and journals to official communiqués and policies to popular
contemporary films – that captured the subtle cultural perceptions of submarines
throughout the twentieth century.
Rather than the narrow, policy-based reasons for USW offered by previous
historians, this study uses the lens of culture to argue that the United States Navy’s road
to USW in the Second World War was intensely complex and far from certain.
Furthermore, by extending the scope of research beyond the realm of the two world wars
and into the Cold War, the following work proposes that the story of American
submarine warfare came full-circle in the twentieth century. At the outbreak of the First
World War, strategists regarded the vessels as suitable only for costal defense. Public
disdain for German commerce raiding and international loss of life nearly outlawed
submarines several times during the interwar period. Yet after a brief bout of ruthless

26

Kathleen Canning, Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 18501914 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).
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war in the Pacific, the weapons slowly emerged as the harbinger of peace and freedom in
the Cold War, proving that the best defense was an imposing offense.
Though arranged thematically according to the three dominant cultural identities
of submarines during the twentieth century, the chapters in this study follow a generally
chronological order. Chapter one takes the reader from the First World War through the
London Naval Treaty of 1930, highlighting the crests and troughs of cultural discourse
surrounding the “Despised Weapon of the Hun.” In an effort to establish the context in
which American policy makers acted during the interwar years, this section leaves the
discussion of on-the-ground decision making throughout the 1920s and 1930s to the
following chapter. Working within a discourse dominated by Germany’s use of
submarines forced the interwar US Navy to find a legitimate way to incorporate the
vessels into an existing Mahanian doctrine of large fleet engagements. Chapter two
explores the creation of a military arm that became as “Silent as the Grave” during the
war of strangulation against Japan. Additionally, this chapter chronicles the disconnect
that developed between wartime cultural discourse and reality. Finally, the third chapter
reveals how an ever-shifting post-war memory of the weapon’s use between 1941 and
1945, mixed with Cold War culture and the changed nature of the Nuclear Navy,
established a discourse that enveloped the “Flagship of Freedom” with patriotic pride as
demonstrated by the case study of the USS West Virginia.
The debate between Retaliatory School historians and their intellectual opponents
has led to an academic dead end. By limiting their focus to whether or not US officials
and military leaders had a desire to conduct USW against Japan in a potential Pacific war,
scholars on both sides have overlooked the larger issue of submarine warfare evolution

13
throughout the twentieth century’s entirety. Essayist John Gierach has mused that
“making peace with someone tends to bring them into the fold, but before you can make
peace, you have to have a little war.”27 The American cultural experience with
submarines from the First World War through the Cold War did just that, for beneath the
surface of implemented policies churned a turbulent sea of opposing currents born from
the diverging interests of naval theorists, politicians, and public opinion.

27

John Gierach, Sex, Death, and Fly-fishing (New York: Simon and Schuster/Fireside, 1990), 180.
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CHAPTER II
DESPISED WEAPON OF THE HUN
She [a submarine] will never revolutionize modern
warfare…but for coast defense purposes she is of
inestimable value. ~Superintendent of the US Naval
Academy28
[E]xperience has shown that its scope as a weapon of
attack…is definitely limited…[and] as far as the experience
of this war goes[,] the submarine is not destined to
revolutionize naval warfare… ~Living Age, 191529
The widespread use of submarines during the First World War revolutionized the
cultural conception and physical conduct of warfare in the twentieth century. It brought
to light the terrible and destructive force that walked hand-in-hand with modern
technological and industrial progress. For contemporaries who experienced, observed,
and/or read about the psychological and physical terrors birthed by the Great War,
scientific advancement came at the cost of humanity’s compassion for fellow human
beings. The cultural reaction to and discourse about submarines in the United States
between 1914 and 1930 demonstrates the lasting effects the weapons exerted over
modern warfare and society despite an early belief to the contrary. The poetic loss of
innocence attributed to the Great War extended beyond the imagined realm of humanity’s
soul and into the world of naval warfare. The myth, and later the memory, that the
submarine destroyed the notion of honorable naval warfare took hold between 1914 and
1918, gaining momentum during the Versailles Peace Conference. While the ambivalent
face of technological progress did receive some blame for the new dishonorable warfare,
28

Quoted in Blair, Silent Victory, 9. Though Blair does not give a specific date for the above
quote, he placed it in his discussion of fin-de-siècle U.S. naval policy.
29

“The Future of the Submarine,” Living Age, October 23, 1915, 242.
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most responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of Germany. Media reports confirmed
and reinforced this sentence during and after the war, giving rise to what this study
identifies as the first culturally dominant identity of the submarine in twentieth-century
America: Despised Weapon of the Hun.
It did not take long after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine
warfare (USW) on February 4, 1915 for America to protest the targeting of civilians
aboard ships. While the legacy of the RMS Lusitania sinking in May of 1915 endures in
today’s society, the spark that first set the American tinderbox aflame came over a month
before. On April 10, a German U-boat torpedoed and sank the RMS Falaba, killing over
one hundred civilians, including one American. A survey of national newspaper reports
following the incident reveals the voracity with which the country’s citizenry reacted to
the sinking: “a crime against humanity;” “a frenzied beast at bay;” “not war, but murder;”
“brutal;” “cold-blooded;” “cowardly;” “atrocious;” “assassination;” “it tends to make the
stories of other German atrocities credible;” “shocking bloodthirstiness;” “a massacre;”
“uncivilized;” “piracy;” “barbarism;” “a humiliation to all the world;” “wickedness such
as the history of war will find it difficult to match.”30 Literary Digest went on to report
that the justification offered by the German navy – that the death of a relative handful of
non-combatants paled in comparison to the millions of people starving at the hands of the
British naval blockade –fell on the ears of a deaf American public.31

30

Quoted in “When the Torpedo Kills Non-Combatants,” Literary Digest, April 10, 1915, 789-90.
This study uses Literary Digest as a lens into contemporary newspaper reports as the digest drew on a
multitude of politically diverse newspapers in an effort to tell all sides of a given story. When a report
appeared in the journal, it served as an indication that the subject of the story concerned most media outlets
throughout the United States.
31

Ibid., 790.
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The same issue of Literary Digest included several articles, cartoons, and
photographs that painted Germans in a negative light, maintaining the persona so richly
described in the publication’s lead story. The German starvation tales met with
skepticism and a cartoon poking-fun at a rail-thin “German Michel” who exclaimed,
referencing the supposed 200-gram bread ration, “Well, I shall have to pull in my belt
another hole.”32 This farcified image juxtaposed a story on the opposing page that told of
the British disgust with reports of “pampered” German POWs following rumors that
English POWs, held by Germany, were the objects of hardships and atrocities. A cartoon
from London’s St. James Gazette accompanied the story, synthesizing its two main
points. In the depiction, two captured German officers sat in lounge chairs, with feet
propped up, while English valets lit pipes and cigars and served beer steins from silver
platters. An angry John Bull stood in the background with clenched fist as he muttered,
“I don’t want to treat them as they do our prisoners in Germany – but this is going a bit
too far.”33 Though this and other images discussed later in the study did originate from
outside the United States, the fact to remember is that the American pressed syndicated
foreign reports, pictures, and cartoons, bombarding the public with war rhetoric.
Yet another article from the same issue of Literary Digest continued the antiGerman motif, though more subtly on this occasion. The discussion of “German WarProfessors,” meaning members of Germany’s pre-war academic community who served
in the army, appeared innocent enough on the surface. After all, the reputation of the
belligerent country’s intellectual elite, particularly at this time, carried with it a certain
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cultural sophistication. Highlighting the reopening of the Brussels Museum under
German occupation seemed a logical way to present the civilized side of the Hun. The
covert jabs at the German character, however, came briefly in the captions that
accompanied photographs of the museum’s new curators:
“German Soldiers Amid Belgian Art.”
The Brussels Museum was reopened on February 7, the
first time since the war began. Two thousand Germans,
soldiers and civilians, visited the place. Those before us
are inspecting the work of Belgian sculptor, Meunier.
Some Belgians came to see if their treasures were still
safe.34
Taken by itself, this last jab seems like a hollow cultural quip. Yet, when placed in the
context of the issue’s other fierier language, the line assumes a variety a meanings: at
best, Germans became petty thieves; at worst, they embodied absolute evil. According to
the “Vernian” model, submarine warfare itself, at this time, became evil because it
reflected the dark character of its master – Germany.
Oddly enough, the event that popular memory erroniously associates with
America’s entry into the First World War received a milder treatment – at least in terms
of adjective use – in the nation’s press. The front page news of the Lusitania sinking
brought with it calls for action. Former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt reached out
to his former constituents, arguing that America owed quick and decisive action, “not
only to humanity[,] but to our own national self-respect.”35 An accompanying Chicago
Tribune cartoon showed Uncle Sam, Norway, and Sweden violently flailing in a boat
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named Neutrality as a German torpedo struck the hull.36 The Springfield, Massachusetts
Republican warned that the successful sinking of Lusitania might encourage Germany to
bolster its campaign of USW, “utterly regardless of the murderous deterioration in the
moral character of the warfare which submarine attacks on passenger-ships involve.”
The Republican concluded that the “inhumanity” of the submarine made it an
“assassin.”37
Addressing the seemingly contradictory nature of contemporary media reports
surrounding Falaba and Lusitania and popular memory requires a multi-faceted
explanation. Because the two disasters occurred within the span of approximately one
month, newspaper editors undoubtedly needed a fresh way to spin the latest German
atrocity.38 The progression of human emotion suggests that the first sinking jolted the
American public, requiring them to find the appropriate language with which they could
engage the issue publicly. With a mastery of this new language, America met the second
sinking with a firm resolve to act.39 Furthermore, the need for “action today” came, most
assuredly, from the rise in non-combatant fatalities, particularly in terms of American
lives lost. The torpedoing of Lusitania killed nearly 1.200 people, including 128
Americans. Compared to the Falaba incident, wherein only one U.S. citizen died,
Lusitania struck a nerve in the American public, the pain of which did not dissipate in the
months that followed.
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As Germany’s policy of USW continued throughout the summer of 1915,
American anti-submarine rhetoric deepened, placing more pressure on President Wilson
to act. The front-page story of Literary Digest from July 31, 1915 featured a “History of
the First Year of the War,” and discussed German double-talk of bowing to Wilson’s
demands for the cessation of USW. Depictions of Uncle Sam reflected the perception
that Germany had abused America’s good faith. In one cartoon, the bloodied hand of the
country’s patriarch reached out to Germany’s clenched fist, the caption noting that “…he
still offers to shake hands.” Similarly, a drawing appeared of Sam examining his holeridden hat and remarking that, “They may have been unfortunate accidents, but the
marksmanship is deadly.”40 In both cases, the wounds and tears alike bore the names of
sunken liners like Lusitania, Gulflight, Frye, and Cushing.
In September 1915, Americans reveled in what they believed marked a diplomatic
win for the neutral countries of the world. The news of German Ambassador Johann von
Bernstorff’s assurance to the Wilson administration that submarines would no longer fire
on merchant ships without warning brought a sigh of relief to the nation’s public;
newspaper headlines proclaimed “Germany Yields to Wilson” and “Submarine Warfare a
Failure.”41 In October, Living Age published a British article entitled, “The Future of the
Submarine.”42 The anonymous author described the impracticality of sustained USW,
arguing that “…because of the inferiority of the submarine [to surface vessels]…the
present German submarine campaign has been checked.”43 While the article offered no

40

“History of the First Year of the War,” Literary Digest, July 31, 1915, 198.

41

Ibid., 509-572.

42

“Future,” Living Age, 240-43.

20
evidence for such inferiority, reason suggests that British hubris as the world’s mightiest
sea power informed the author’s conclusion. Similar articles praised White House
efforts, while simultaneously assuring the public that even without such diplomatic
intervention, USW could not endure. The time when the submarine menace ruled
supreme, it appeared, had come to peaceful conclusion.
And yet, the official end of USW on September 1 did not disperse the air of
apprehension that continued to hang over the United States. Ever the hard-liner,
Theodore Roosevelt continued to speak out against Germany, insisting that merely
“stop[ping] the policy of assassination” merited no gratitude on America’s part.44
Germany’s true motivations for halting USW became a point of debate in the media,
bolstered by reports in the British and French presses that the Hun had lulled America
into a false sense of security. Literary Digest published a German photo entitled, “Tirpitz
in a Tender Moment,” that showed the Grand Admiral holding a young child. Though
the caption scoffed at the admiral’s reputation as a “baby killer” who loved “piracy and
murder,” it still noted that he had a zeal for “vigorous submarine warfare” that German
Chancellor von Bethman Hollweg managed to curb in the wake of American protests.45
The implication that Tirpitz and his fleet of U-boats waited for the right time to renew the
devouring of civilian liners pervaded contemporary newspapers. A cartoon in London’s
Westminster Gazette typified this belief, chronicling a brief conversation between the
Kaiser and von Tirpitz:
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von Tirpitz – “Boo-hoo! They won’t let me be frightful any
more!”
The Kaiser – “Nevermind, Tirpy! You can make a
‘mistake’ now and again, and Bernstorff can apologize.”46
The “Summer of the Submarine” had done its damage. American faith that Germany
would keep its promise to conduct proper submarine warfare ran thin. And so, the
country anxiously waited as the war continued.
The sudden arrival of U-53 in Newport Harbor on October 7, 1916, renewed
American fear of the submarine menace. After a brief three-hour stay, the submarine left
the harbor, cleared neutral waters, and began what Living Age called a “career of
destruction.”47 Because the German commander provided ample warning and time for
evacuation of the ships, none of the eight sinkings resulted in loss of life. Nevertheless,
the press refused to credit the actions of the commander, explaining that the lack of
fatalities resulted from the “promptness and able seamanship shown by the American
naval force.”48 A correspondent with the New York Evening Post stated that submarine
operations, so close to American shores, exerted the most visible strain on diplomatic
relations between Washington and Berlin. He added that “it is largely a question of luck”
and a matter of time before Germany, willingly or accidentally, violates the conditions
agreed upon with the United States.49
During the U-53 affair, Literary Digest published four cartoons from Nashville,
New York, and Brooklyn newspapers that epitomized the generally perceived
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characterizations of German submarine warfare.50 Cartoonists often drew submarines as
some type of canine. The dogs, by and large, fell into two categories: a loyal dachshund,
calling on the “sour kraut and wieners” motif, or a ravenous wolf, foaming at the mouth
and straining at its leash. Both types of illustrations included a German master, either
training the dachshund to do a new trick or holding the leash of monstrous beast. The
cartoon from Nashville offered a different perspective that still captured the essence of
the canine approach: a recovering alcoholic, dressed as a German, frantically paced
outside a bar labeled “Resumption of Submarine Warfare” with a caption that asked the
question, “Backsliding?” All of these illustrations reinforced and bolstered the cultural
link between the character of Germans and the nature of submarine warfare.
Throughout this period, policy makers in the nation’s capital noted the fluidity of
public opinion and discourse about German submarines. In his postwar memoirs,
Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote that the Lusitania sinking “sent a wave of horror
throughout the country, particularly in the East.”51 Regional proximity to the U-boat
threat certainly affected the degree of public fear, for “as one went westward…the
demands for drastic action grew less emphatic.”52 Due to the lack of public unanimity,
Lansing and other officials in Washington deemed it necessary to avoid the issue of war
until Germany forced the divided citizenry to unite through a “slow and irritating period
of education and enlightenment,” vis-à-vis USW.53 As discussed above, Germany’s
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pledge to halt USW in late 1915 did not ease the fear of submarines throughout the
country, and in a January 1916 memorandum to President Wilson, Lansing
acknowledged the continued possibility of war. While the Secretary of State believed
Germany’s aggression would inevitably threaten American sovereignty, he again stated
that “public opinion is not yet ready to accept this point of view. The American people
will have to be educated to a true vision of the menace that Germany is to liberty and
democracy.”54 Though Lansing’s memoirs never revealed the means by which such an
education would occur, every newspaper account of U-boat attacks undoubtedly
strengthened the “true vision” of Germany. By early 1917, the secretary seemed to
believe that America’s “education” neared completion when he concluded another
memorandum to President Wilson: “War cannot come too soon to suit me since I know
that it must come at last.”55
Meanwhile, the failure of the submarine to break the British blockade’s
stranglehold of German shipping, particularly after the surface fleet engagement at the
Battle of Jutland in mid-1916, forced the Imperial Navy’s leaders to conclude that
winning the war rested on the resumption of USW. At the risk of war with America,
USW could, reasoned the Kaiser’s advisors, force the British out of the war before
America entered the fighting. With this gambling logic, Germany announced the renewal
of USM on February 1, 1917, and began sinking enemy shipping at an alarming rate – Uboats sank 386,000 tons of shipping in January, escalating to 881,000 tons by April.56
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German necessity and American public opinion raced toward one another like two
juggernauts on a collision course.
Germany’s submarine salvation immediately became a “Catch 22” when neutral
America declared, “Enough,” on April 4, 1917. Following the February announcement,
the United States severed diplomatic ties with Germany. Though President Wilson still
offered hope that war between the two countries would not come, he clearly stated that
submarines would decide American action:
If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and
prudent foresight of [German] purpose should unhappily
prove unfounded, if American ships and American Lives
[sic] should, in fact, be sacrificed by [German] naval
commanders in heedless contravention of the just and
reasonable understandings of international law and the
obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of
coming again before the Congress to ask that authority be
given me to use any means necessary for the protection of
our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their
peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas.57
Two days later, Wilson made good on his promise and asked that Congress, in response
to the continuance of USW, declare war against Germany. Following the congressional
declaration, Wilson addressed the American people, calling for unified resolve and effort
to end the war quickly, “submarines or no submarines.”58 While the utterances of Wilson
did not create or significantly modify America’s cultural discourse of submarine warfare,
they most assuredly placed that discourse at the forefront of the country’s wartime
memory and shaped the cultural response to the vessels in the decades following the First
World War.
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After America officially entered the war, the nation’s press began to downplay the
threat of German submarines. Wartime propaganda and fewer sinkings – American
Admiral William Sims helped implement a convoy system that escorted 88, 000 ships
through U-boat-infested waters, losing only 436 – undoubtedly played a large role in this
changed discourse, but nonetheless, the relaxed tone of reports from late 1917 and 1918
added a new dimension to existing cultural perceptions.59 In August of 1918, Literary
Digest published a story, mockingly entitled, “The ‘U’-Boats’ Effort to Terrify Us,” in
which a New York Tribune correspondent chronicled submarine actions off the coast of
Cape Cod. While a crowd of observers gathered on sand dunes, an anonymous U-boat
“battled” four fishing scows. The Tribune reporter gave his personal opinion of what the
maneuvers resembled:
A child with a “mad” on is the nearest thing to this UBoat’s tactics; say, a child locked up in a room for
punishment who vents his wrath on the only enemy
available by upsetting the chairs and pulling the covers off
the crib.60
In closing, the reporter assured his readers that, scows aside, “the submarine in the
Atlantic has been an utter failure…”61 This humorous account illustrates the radical shift
from the abrasive rhetoric used to describe the Falaba sinking to one of the final
conceptions of submarine warfare in 1918, making American wartime discourse anything
but static.
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At various times throughout the war, members of Congress sought to uncover the
reasons for conflicting reports that the submarine threat had subsided. In late January
1918, the House Committee on Naval Affairs pressed Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels to evaluate the progress made by the Allies in checking German submarine
attacks. While Daniels did believe that the Allies would win the naval war, his response
provided clear reasons for the shifting public perception of submarines.
The loss by the submarines is like a pendulum. At one time
the loss was so great, some months ago, that people were
panic stricken. Then it fell down so low that everybody
became perfectly satisfied the menace was ended; that is,
the average man thought so. Then it went up again…It will
not do to say that we have overcome it; it will not do to say
that the menace does not still exist…62
In addition to newspaper accounts that illustrated the “submarine pendulum,” members of
the committee noted that differing reports concerning the existence of a submarine threat
helped fuel public confusion whenever congressmen returned from fact-finding missions
in England. Because of the dynamic nature of submarine war, Secretary Daniels offered
that no “Congressman has been given the correct figures, or anyone else.”63 Submarine
warfare, therefore, presented the perfect breeding ground for cultural discourse largely
disconnected from reality. Despite this disconnect, the submarine discourse forged
between 1914 and 1918 carried over into the peace-time world and began to affect onthe-ground reality as diplomats from across the globe converged on Paris to erect an
“eternal peace.”
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Immediately after the November 1918 armistice, reports began to pour out of
Germany that painted the country’s population in a sympathetic light. Germans called for
leniency at the Paris Peace Conference in wake of the continued British naval blockade
that starved the country into submission, but during this time, the American press
invoked the memory of the evil Hun vessels. The Wall Street Journal reacted to such
pleas by declaring that “every German family should be furnished with an appetizing list
of food-cargoes sent to the bottom by U-Boats.”64 Stephane Lauzanne, editor of the Paris
Matin, warned the American public to be wary of German “sob stuff,” noting that “it is
ridiculous to speak of the ‘good German people’ – the same German people who shouted
with glee when the Lusitania was sunk and little American children drowned.”65
Lauzanne concluded his warning by insisting that the only good Germans were those who
were dead.66
Not even reports that the German navy mutinied in the war’s final months found
sympathy among most Americans. The Philadelphia Public Ledger observed that, “The
German seamen never mutinied against orders to kill women and children.”67 The
Greenville, South Carolina Piedmont colored all German sailors as dishonorable,
observing that while “the Hun battleships had a disgraceful ending [at Scapa Flow]…the
submarines had a disgraceful beginning.”68 The revival of fiery wartime rhetoric brought
with it a call for justice as President Wilson prepared to meet with fellow diplomats in
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Paris. Newspapers explicitly tied former Kaiser Wilhelm II and perpetrators of USW
together as nothing more than common criminals. The Baltimore Sun insisted that
“whatever is done with William [sic], there are other supercriminals who must not escape
if justice is to be done: the instigators and perpetrators of U-Boat infamies…It would be
unpardonable if any of these should be allowed to escape swift and terrible
punishment.”69 With such a sweeping mandate for reciprocity, the delegates in Paris
began to draft terms of peace that cited USW as justification for burdening Germany with
the payment of massive war reparations.
Following the completion of the Treaty of Versailles, Americans rejoiced in what
the publishers of Women’s Weekly called Freedom’s Triumph.70 In the volume,
Freedom’s Triumph, the authors wrote about the inhumane nature of German warfare.
Submarines featured prominently alongside pictures of poison gas attacks and
flamethrowers as “diabolical method[s] of warfare originated by the Germans.”71 An
article entitled, “The Honor of the Seas,” addressed the “ruthless” use of USW, again
calling on the memory of the Lusitania.72 According to the article, “Never, until the
present war, did a nation that pretended to being [sic] civilized, allow women and
children to become the prey of warcraft.”73 Similarly, a later article about the scuttling of
the German fleet at Scapa Flow left no doubt as to the nature of “the Hun code of
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honor.”74 The author of the article called the scuttling incident an “act of wanton
destruction and criminal wastefulness” that attempted to avoid the consequences of
“[Germany’s] foolishness and final defeat.”75 So strong was the desire to condemn
German actions that the article’s author suggested the killing of unarmed German sailors
by the British navy “in wild and righteous indignation.”76 Clearly, the cultural
conception of the Despised weapon of the Hun reached its zenith during and immediately
after the Paris Peace Conference.
With Germany put in its proper place, most Americans turned their attention to
domestic issues even as the country’s leaders convened the world’s largest disarmament
conference in late 1921. When national interest did focus on the Washington
Conference, however, public opinion revealed a lack of the unanimity that had helped
guide the diplomats in Paris two years earlier. In newspapers across the country, editors
railed that the conference was either too great or too limited in its scope: an excessive
disarmament agreement would weaken the nation’s ability to defend itself, but too light
of an agreement would fail to check the potential aggression of foreign powers. William
Randolph Hearst’s New York-based American called the conference an attack against
U.S. sovereignty, while the Springfield, Massachusetts Republican noted that, for the
event’s organizers, “it has not been deemed practicable to include aircraft in the scalingdown process.”77 Similarly, the New York Times asked its readers, “Of what avail would
it be to reduce and regulate dreadnought construction if nothing were done to set a limit
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to the expansion of new instruments of war?”78 Many editors, such as those at the
Canadian Kingston Whig and the Colorado Springs Gazette, channeled their fiscallyminded audience when reporting on the conference proceedings. The Whig suggested
that “an excellent figurehead for battleships would be a formal design of a weeping
taxpayer,” and the Gazette asserted that, “if placed end to end, the national debts would
conclude that war is unprofitable.”79 Other papers, including the Lincoln Star, viewed
the financial benefit of scrapping naval construction with skepticism: “You see, by
reducing navies we can save money enough to build far-cruising and heavily-armored
aircraft.”80
Public faith in the hope promised by the Washington Conference waned as the
world leaders assembled appeared as divided as the host nation. British representative
Arthur Balfour called the proposed limitation on submarine tonnage too liberal given the
events of the world war.81 As a nation of limited naval strength, France opposed Great
Britain’s attempts to severely limit – or abolish outright – the use of submarines. The
New York Times ran the response of Stephane Lauzanne to Balfour in which the French
newspaper editor called submarines the “arm of the poor,” noting that, “in these times of
expensive living, it is the only arm which is still cheap.”82 While the Lansing Capital
News jokingly remarked that “nations could safely lose their arms if statesmen wouldn’t
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lose their heads,”83 the New York Call feared that the conference would bring “the same
disillusionment that followed the ‘war to end war.’”84 Reporting on the diplomatic
squabbling, the Norfolk Virginia Pilot surmised that “while agreement at the Washington
Conference is not to be expected before snow flies, it is to be hoped for before fur
flies.”85
As diplomats argued over the size of future navies, the American public continued
to debate the issue of submarine warfare. Many papers constantly voiced concerns that
the conference would leave several stones unturned when it came to regulating new
weapons of war, particularly the submarine. The St. Louis Star proclaimed that
“America’s influence at the conference should be thrown against the weapons that are
directed at non-combatants – the submarine and poison gas.”86 Other Americans
believed that the aim of the conference should mirror that of 1919 Paris and make future
wars impossible. As noted by Literary Digest, dozens of papers, including the Louisville
Courier-Journal, the Des Moines Register, and the Baltimore Sun, agreed that “it is
useless to forbid inventions; the only way to prevent the use of aerial bombs, submarines,
and poison gas in war is to prevent war.”87 From a more pragmatic perspective the New
York Globe reminded its readers that “war is slaughter, and can never be anything else,
and victory will always go to the contestant who is best at killing.”88 In the end, the
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conference proved to some observers that “the pen is mightier than the battleship,”89 but
not the submarine. Battleships commanders had committed no crimes, whereas
submarines had, and yet the conference treated the two as deserving of equal
consideration. The Washington Treaty merely dictated that the signatories limit the
number of submarines in their respective navies and use the vessels honorably during
times of war – an easy promise to make in peacetime. As the Steubenville, Ohio HeraldStar observed, “Germany is privileged to snicker a bit when she hears that battleships are
wicked while subs are essential.”90 The grand disarmament conference had done nothing
to eliminate the weapons that struck fear into heart of America between 1914 and 1918.
While the Washington Conference failed to definitively settle the “submarine
question” despite strong postwar anti-German sentiment, the 1920s saw a shift in cultural
discourse that further hindered subsequent attempts to control the Hun weapon. In 1927,
famed writer Lowell Thomas published Count Luckner, The Sea Devil, a volume that
went far in dismantling America’s negative perception of Germans.91 Thomas’ book – in
actuality, the count’s autobiography – told the story of a first-class sailor whose
intentions were honorable and whose actions were admirable. As the captain of a
commerce raider during the Great War, Luckner snuck past the British blockade and
commenced a campaign of principled destruction. The count “had the unique and
enviable reputation of disrupting Allied shipping without ever having taken a human life
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or so much as drowning a ship’s cat.”92 Likening Luckner to the famed “Lawrence of
Arabia,” Thomas asserted that the captain and his crew were “romantic people traveling
in the most romantic way known to the sea” – in a wooden sail ship.93 Although many
years of serving before the mast had rendered him “unable to express himself without
using sulphury profanities,” daring tenacity and strong self-discipline allowed Luckner to
replace the “blazing nautical oaths” with the English expression, “By Joe!”94
Undoubtedly, Thomas’s faithful readers – of whom he had many – read such turns of
phrase and thought, “If there is one such man in Germany, perhaps there are more.”
The cultural importance of Luckner’s story becomes clearer when placed in the
context of 1920s international politics, particularly in terms of German war guilt. In late
1918, the German government appointed Legation Secretary Bernhard W. von Bülow to
head a special bureau of inquiry with the expressed purpose of proving the country’s
innocence to the delegates at Versailles.95 The hurried efforts of the bureau created the
“professors’ memorandum” of May 27, 1919. Signed by four members of the Heidelberg
Association for a Policy of Justice,96 the document concluded that Germany had
conducted a “defensive war against tsarism” in 1914.97 After the failure to temper Allied
resolve, Bülow’s bureau became the War Guilt Section of the Foreign Ministry, charged
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with the long-term historical revision of the war’s causes. After hiring three respected
academics to serve as editors, the War Guilt Section published forty volumes of
government records between 1922 and 1927 from the Foreign Ministry office that
“proved” German innocence in aggressively waging war during 1914.98 Despite the
academic veneer, Bülow retained sole discretionary power in determining which
documents to include in Die Grosse Politik, ultimately creating a type of “scholarly”
propaganda.99 Nonetheless, Bülow’s project helped pave the way for other revisionists
scholars of the 1920s.
While Bülow’s War Guilt Section labored, post-war Germany rapidly declined in
the midst of political, social, and economic turmoil. The new Weimar government
proved unable to deal with rebellious factions of the political left and right. Because the
Treaty of Versailles limited the size of the nation’s army, particularly the officer corps,
Germans lost an important pillar of their national identity rooted in long-standing
Prussian militarism.100 Most devastating of all, the wartime food shortage mixed with
economic disaster in the form of hyper-inflation, crippling the defeated nation.
Germany’s supposed innocence, coupled with the country’s internal deterioration, caused
people throughout the Western world, including America, to conclude that the treaty was
far too punitive. As a result, international sympathy for Germany grew throughout the
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decade, creating room for revisionist interpretations of the war’s causes and
consequences.
Inspired by the evidence presented in Die Grosse Politik and bent on removing
the stigma of war guilt from their country, nationalistic authors of German reactionary
literature during the 1920s questioned the role of France in the years leading up to
1914.101 In theory, proving German innocence and French guilt in terms of causing the
First World War would remove Germany’s post-war obligations to France, particularly
the payment of massive reparations.102 During this time, the belief in the French desire
for revanche helped frame much of the scholarship. According to this approach, the 1871
loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany following the Franco-Prussian War compelled
French leaders during the next forty years to construct their country’s foreign policy
around the idea of revanche. The theory became reality when the Treaty of Versailles
stripped Germany of the two territories and restored them to France. Historians bolstered
their argument with the fact that France’s president in 1914, Raymond Poincaré, grew up
in Lorraine and experienced the German take-over of the region as a young boy. British
and American revisionism, inspired by Versailles diplomat John Maynard Keynes, grew
in popularity throughout the decade.103 Historians such as Harry Elmer Barnes and
Robert L. Owen argued that a Franco-Russian alliance, seeking the territorial acquisitions
of Alsace-Lorraine and the Dardanelles, conspired to engineer a Balkan conflict.104 Even
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in France, leftist historians charged their country and Poincaré with warmongering until
the 1929 publication of the country’s diplomatic documents.105 Taken as a whole,
Thomas’s Sea Devil and the easing of anti-German tensions throughout America dealt a
crippling blow to the dominant cultural perception that submarines were evil.106
When world leaders met at the 1930 London Naval Conference to discuss the
issue of abolishing submarines, the absence of a strong German navy exposed the
opposing world views associated with the vessels. The representatives from the United
States and Great Britain urged their fellow diplomats to consider the total abolition of
submarines “in the belief that [they] cannot be controlled during wartime.”107 In contrast,
France and Japan – both of whom had smaller, weaker navies – insisted that the weapons
were essential for coastal defense. At the conclusion of the conference the Philadelphia
Record recorded the diplomatic stalemate as follows: “After being solemnly brought to
trial on charges of murder, the submarine has been released on parole and under
obligations of good behavior.”108 As with the Washington Conference, London’s attempt
to rid the world of submarines ended the same as it began – with hope that civilized
nations would fight civilly. Viewing the London treaty as nothing more than a farce, the
Washington Post accused the country’s delegation of “utterly misrepresenting American
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Policy” in advocating the abolition of submarines. In fact, the Post noted, “the security
of the Panama Canal depends largely upon the skilful use of defensive [italics mine]
submarines.”109
The Post’s observation of U.S. submarine policy proved more accurate than
perhaps the correspondent realized. Since 1897, the United States had planned for a
potential war with Japan, the strategy for which composed “War Plan Orange.” As
technologies evolved, naval strategists had to account for the use of new weapons such as
submarines. In the aftermath of the First World War, U.S. policy makers had to walk a
fine line when it came to using the vessels as commerce raiders. As noted by Edward
Miller, the submarine dilemma was two fold in the 1930s: (a) Despite an ease in
international tensions, the American public still attributed German USW with the
country’s entrance into the war following the “indiscriminate sinkings” of unarmed
merchant vessels, and (b) owing to the physical impracticality of searching possible
belligerent ships, “submarines could not honor the gentlemanly code of the Hague
Convention” and other such treaties.110 Despite the protests of submariners, plan
“Orange” continued to adhere to international treaties that tied the hands of the Navy.
With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the cultural perception of the
submarine as the Despised Weapon of the Hun officially met its end, having been in a
veritable iron lung since 1930. Because the aerial bombardment of the naval base had
neglected to destroy the submarine fleet, submarines immediately became the first line of
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attack.111 However, due to the lack of initiative shown by the prudent submarine
commanders, the United States strategy of USW failed for several months into 1942. It
was only when skippers began exhibiting uninhibited zeal that the vessels started gaining
ground against the Japanese navy and merchant fleet. As such, the “changing of the
guard” that occurred onboard submarines marked the cultural death of the Despised
Weapon of the Hun. In its place came another cultural identity that had lain in wait since
the 1920s – one that was as Silent as the Grave. It is to that strain of discourse and reality
that this study’s second chapter will attend.
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CHAPTER III
SILENT AS THE GRAVE
The formal graduation exercise which used to be held
before the war started has been replaced by an informal
gathering such as this morning’s assembly. This lack of
fanfare is consistent with the submarine way of life.
However[,] this lack of ceremony does not lessen the
importance of your stepping into a new field of usefulness
to the submarine service…I caution you not to be
optimistic or to take away an idea the submarine work out
on patrol is ‘Peaches and Cream.’ It is the submarine’s job
to carry on a campaign of steady attrition. ~Remarks to
Submarine Officer Class #74, December 1943112
The graduation speech from 1943 reveals the uncertainty that plagued American
submariners for decades. First and foremost, the speaker in question correctly described
the nature of contemporary discourse surrounding American submarine warfare. The
branch of the United States Navy known as the “Silent Service” was one enshrouded in a
mystery that posed more questions than it answered. The American public’s quiet
acquiescence that submarines were, in fact, a permanent fixture of the country’s military
was a relatively minor footnote in the submarine’s story. Throughout the interwar period,
the submarine debate continuously returned to the same nagging point of inquiry: what
role will these vessels have in a modern navy? The graduation speaker indicates that, at
least by 1943, the necessities of war had answered that question and forced submariners
to become arbiters of attrition. Yet, the reference to the perception of submarine work as
“Peaches and Cream” also reveals an awareness that not all wartime patrols concentrated
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on commerce raiding or engagements with enemy warships. Indeed, war patrols largely
consisted of monotonous routine, interspersed with occasional excitement. Historian
Stephanie Cousineau has called the American submarine war against Japan “a search for
identity” because submariners “wore many hats, as fleet supporters, mine-layers, lifeguarders, warship killers and, not least, as wagers of unrestricted submarine warfare.”113
Despite Cousineau’s accurate assertion that US submarines lacked a clear
identity, she, like other naval historians, has failed to explore fully the roots of wartime
events and public perception. By focusing solely on the military perspective, she and
other historians have presented readers with an incomplete picture. Most treatments of
interwar naval policy regarding submarines have correctly noted that popular memory of
German “atrocities” during the First World War played a role in deciding strategy for
future wars, yet generally gloss over the nature of that memory with a single, generic
sentence.
The lack of a unified cultural perception regarding the use of American
submarines created an environment that fostered the growth of competing submarine
strategies. Craig Felker has noted that during the interwar period “naval officers
struggled to shape a technological anomaly to exist within a tightly bounded [Mahanian]
strategic framework.”114 The discourse about the “Despised Weapon of the Hun”
similarly forced strategists to work within a cultural framework wary of offensive
submarine operations, at least with regard to commerce raiding. As sneaky conceptions
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of the vessels weakened, the aggressive plans for US submarines gained momentum.
However, the submarine’s lack of cultural identity hampered the creation of a definitive
strategic purpose that spilled over into the practical execution of the Pacific War,
especially during the early months of 1942. The wanting for a culturally accepted guerre
de course likewise gave birth to the perception that submarines were, by nature, highly
secretive. During the Second World War, Hollywood co-opted and bolstered the notion
of the “Silent Service,” lending credence to a limited submarine discourse in the interest
of “national security.” What follows is an examination of how the interwar US Navy
reacted to both a well-defined discourse about German submarines and a more loosely
constructed, uncertain discourse surrounding American submarine warfare. Ultimately,
ambiguous policies about the weapons established a new discourse that was Silent as the
Grave.
When world leaders met at the Washington Naval Conference in late 1921 and
early 1922, the use of submarines by the Hun dominated debates of the vessels’ abolition.
At the end of December 1921, Literary Digest ran an article that easily faded into the
static generated by the conference. “Lost Submarines that Saved Themselves,” told the
harrowing, noncombatant tales of two US submarines that suffered from accidental
sinkings.115 Literary Digest noted that both crew’s actions were examples of “heroic
manhood, expert skill, supreme self-sacrifice and lightning intelligence” that “add[ed]
another incident to the heroic annals of the sea, to which the submarine has contributed
more than its share.”116 The S-48 experienced an uncontrollable dive in late 1921 while
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cruising through Long Island Sound en route to New London, Ct. After hours of backbreaking work, the crew managed to create enough buoyancy in the bow to raise that
portion of the ship out of the water. In the case of the AL-4, however, human error
played an equal role in creating the problem as human perseverance did in solving it.
When a “green” sailor turned the wrong valve, the submarine began taking on
unnecessary ballast and plunged nose-first into the mud, 294 feet below the surface of
Bantry Bay, Ireland in 1918. The Digest writers told their readers that both stories were
important because “the work of our submarines during the war escaped without more
than the briefest mention.”117 Considering that the defensively-deployed US submarines
did not sink any ships during the war,118 it is unlikely that the 1921 article added much
luster to the reputations of US submariners.
The perception of US submarines as a relatively weak arm of the navy appeared
throughout the decade that witnessed the First World War. In 1910, a General Board
planning aide directed that, in the event of war with Japan, twenty long-range (150 miles)
submarines could deploy as defensives forces to guard the waters outside the naval base
at Subic in the Philippines.119 Such a force, continued the aide, could render the entire
base “well nigh impenetrable.”120 Three years later, theorists endorsed use of an on-shore
fortress, coupled with a thick net of off-shore minefields and submarines, for the
protection of Guam.121 War plans in 1917 allocated “a few troops and submarines to
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police” the “unimportant and unendangered [sic]” area around Alaska.122 By the 1920s,
however, planners dropped the entire area from the strategic War Plan Orange.123 On the
surface, these examples appear progressive in that such an unpopular weapon featured
prominently in the defense of – with the exception of Alaska – important South Pacific
naval bases. In truth, relegating an entire class of ships to defensive tasks in a navy built
on the principles of ruthless offensive tactics equated to being a poor, beat cop in
Prohibition Chicago.
There were the occasional naval officers, though, who called for the expansion of
the submarine’s role. Notably, Lieutenant Chester Nimitz wrote, in 1912, an article for
the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings that touted submarines of the “near future” as
dangerous offensive weapons.124 Specifically, Nimitz declared that “the gradual
improvement in the size, motive power, and speed of the submarine…will have a large
part in deciding fleet action.”125 Immediately after the war, Captain Thomas Hart, head
of Submarine Section, similarly pointed out to his superiors that “the submarine will be
an extremely valuable weapon for…operations against Japanese commerce,” citing as a
precedent the German use of USW in the preceding years.126 While the words of Nimitz
and Hart spoke for a minority within the navy community – both were submariners – they
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nonetheless indicate the beginnings of a multi-faceted discourse about the use of US
submarines.
The debate between offensive and defensive submarine theorists proved largely
academic – no vessel in existence could meet the needs of large-scale fleet operations –
until technological necessity reared its head. Although the Washington Conference failed
to abolish submarines outright, it did limit the tonnage a given navy could devote to the
vessels. More importantly for American war planners, the conference imposed
limitations on the development of military bases, creating a need for new submarine
development. Article XIX of the treaty halted US military development of
mandates/possessions west of the 180th meridian.127 The treaty therefore left the US with
only one major fortified naval base in the Pacific – Pearl Harbor. At 4850 miles from
Manila and 3400 miles from Tokyo Bay, the location of this last outpost meant interwar
period planners could no longer entertain ideas of creating permanent submarine bases in
the South Pacific and reinforced the need for a long-range submarine.128
As submarine development progressed to meet demands during the 1920s, the US
Navy struggled to define the role of the vessels in any future war. Shortly after the
Washington Conference, the navy assigned Admiral Edwin Anderson, a veteran of the UBoat war, to Manila in order to create his own plans for the area. Because development
of an adequate long-range submarine was still a decade away from completion, Anderson
clung to the defensive school of thought and reported back that a rapidly deployed
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submarine flotilla could hold Luzon in the event of war with Japan.129 Nearly six years
later, drafts of War Plan Orange called for the deployment of fifty-one submarines from
Pearl Harbor to the South Pacific during the first year of the war; however, such drafts
also halted submarine sorties after the second month.130 Submarines, in this perspective,
would be vital to initial operations in the Pacific, but their importance would lessen as the
war progressed.
As with the lack of cultural perception and clearly-defined strategy, the ambiguity
of American submarine warfare filtered down to the country’s training facilities at New
London, Ct. The experiences of Ensign McFarland W. Wood demonstrate this
phenomenon well. Wood entered the submarine officer training program in January 1926
and kept a record of his time in New London.131 Although the school’s workload often
interfered with his ability to make daily entries, the young officer nonetheless revealed,
through his journal, the strengths and weaknesses of the Connecticut-based “SUBSCOL.”
When time permitted, Wood described the on- and off-base excursions of himself and his
classmates, lending his voice to a generation of interwar submariners uncertain of their
place within a modern navy.
Upon his arrival at the SUBSCOL, Wood immediately noted that the intellectual
rigors of the school rivaled those of civilian universities. Instructors impressed upon their
students from day one that the base at New London was “a taut school, and we are going
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to have to work like the dickens” to succeed.132 After a brief inspection of the S-3 and S49, the school’s two practice submarines, Wood concluded that “running a sub is harder
than I imagined, for it has to be balanced when under water to keep it from nosing to the
bottom.”133 Such a statement implies that the contemporary American public would
likewise be unaware of and have little appreciation for even the most basic technical
intricacies of the vessels. Wood himself was a graduate of the Naval Academy at
Annapolis, MD – placing him within a small percentage of collegiate-trained Americans
– yet he had given inadequate thought to the complex nature of submarines. Like the
larger discourse about American submarines, Wood’s own preconception was loosely
constructed and far from definitive. By the end of his first week, the ensign wearily
acknowledged that “they have issued us more books to study here, then [sic] an ordinary
person gets thru [sic] at college.”134 The Electrical and Communication Departments
employed the most pedantic instructors on base as they “vied with each other to see
which could issue the most books. We’ve drawn about fifty texts – they figure we are
blotters, evidently, as there are more to come, we are told.”135 The heavy course load at
the SUBSCOL effectively turned officers and enlisted personnel into uniformed co-eds.
Despite providing a strong grounding in the theory of submarine warfare, the
interwar SUBSCOL continuously suffered from depressed budgets that hampered handson training. According to a 1945 report, between 1916 and 1939, the school used
equipment and training aids salvaged from decommissioned submarines. Throughout the
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period, “many difficulties were encountered in obtaining material for practical
instruction.”136 Wood and his classmates experienced such “difficulties” firsthand. Of
the school’s two practice submarines, only one, the S-49, was operational at the time.
During his first week of instruction, the aspiring submariner wrote “Subs again in the
afternoon, we drew the S-3 today, with her engines all torn down. Consequently the
other two sections went out and had a dive where we didn’t.”137 At other times, the
school’s antiquated equipment became a source of physical danger, rather than just a
point of mere annoyance. April entries in Wood’s diary note the following:
Tuesday, 20;
Fire alarm this morning at eight proved to be an explosion
of the battery, (forward half) of the S-49. Twelve men
injured badly, four of whom died later from shock and
infection of mutilated feet and legs. The usual board of
inquiry will be appointed, and try to determine the reason
for the hydrogen collecting in the battery in explosive
concentration.
Wednesday, 21;
Took a look over the smoldering ruins of the battery room
of the S-49, just opened up, after smothering the fire. The
tops of the battery cells are all blown to kingdom come, but
the plates are not hurt. It will mean new jars, covers and
connections, not such a terrible loss in dollars and cents as
was anticipated. Got quite a thrill when they were
removing the cell connections as they arced heavily. Glad
there was no more hydrogen present at the time, or there
would have been more fireworks than that. About that time
someone discovered that the can of torpedo detonators was
still hanging on the bulkhead with one end off, supported
by two little pieces of wire. A chief put a board down to
walk on, and got them out safely, giving them the deep six
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at the end of the pier, which appeared to me to be the
wrong thing to do.138
Budget problems that interfered with training at New London certainly complicated the
self-image of submariners. On one hand, submarines were important enough to merit
exorbitant intellectual preparation, but on the other hand, fiscal realities necessitated that
students train on hand-me-down equipment that was inconvenient at best, and deadly at
worst.
Using the well-defined discourse about another, newer branch of the military
proved to be a somewhat useful, albeit frustrating, way to describe the nature of US
submarine warfare. Both submarines and airplanes came of age during the First World
War, but discourse surrounding the two technologies differed greatly. Contemporary
Americans juxtaposed the sneaky methods of the former with the lofty, idyllic conception
of the latter. Submariners, like Wood, looked to air aces for the appropriate language
with which to describe their own military experience. After a brief, initial physical
examination upon his entry to the SUBSCOL, Wood wrote that “the real test is later,
much on the order of the aviation physical.”139 Likening the two fields to one another
was not far-fetched; after all, they did share several similarities – the need for killer
instincts, the often dangerous missions, and the magic of exploring new worlds beyond
the scope of their contemporaries’ imagination. Yet, according to Wood, submariners
worked twice as hard as aviators and received only half the recognition:
There is something very fascinating about the whales. But
I hate to think of having to wait at least a year to win one of
the gold fish devices worn on the coat like aviator’s wings.
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Denotes “qualified to command” – where the flyers get
theirs when they are thru [sic] with their six months school,
we are not even eligible until six months after we
graduate.140
Linking submarines and airplanes persisted throughout the interwar period and into the
Pacific War. At least within the military community, a discourse developed that
reinforced Wood’s observations. A 1942 poem by Richard Voge entitled, “Old Fuds,
Young Studs and Lieutenant Commanders,” highlighted the fact that despite having
similar missions, aviators and submariners enjoyed divergent reputations.141 The last
lines of Voge’s poem conclude that
Where’er you send the subs or planes,
You’re bound to chalk up lots of gains –
And losses, too, but what the hell,
Who cares about their personnel?
For planes are chauffeured by young studs,
Lieutenant Commanders run the subs.142
Both Wood and Voge used dominant perceptions about pilots to describe what
submariners were not – sexy young aces who did little, yet received high acclaim.
However, in detailing what submariners were not, both men failed to clearly discern what
submariners actually were.
Not entirely devoted to life beneath the waves, Wood spent his spare time at New
London moonlighting as a photographer. To an extent, his hobby allowed him to
augment his navy pay. After receiving a royalty check from “P. and A.” for eight dollars
and fifty cents, Wood remarked, “Not bad. Wish I had some more to stick in and collect
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on.”143 Money alone, however, was not the ensign’s sole reason for continuing his
photographic aspirations at SUBSCOL: capturing life with his camera allowed Wood to
exercise his artistic muscles. A brief study break in January turned into a full-blown
session of sorting negatives and planning future projects. “My next album will not be in
brown, but black, with the pictures done in a fine carbon print. Lends more atmosphere,
and sophistication [than] the way I have designed the present book.”144 Classroom
discussions about the pomp and circumstance of his June graduation set Wood
daydreaming about the summer Yale-Harvard river races and how he “ought to get some
good pictures of them.”145 Even during training, Wood found time to take pictures.
Bringing his camera along on a torpedo run in April 1926, Wood obtained permission to
take the group’s torpedo retriever, a medium-sized boat used for capturing practice
ordnance, away from the practice submarine in hopes of snapping a few shots of the
vessel. Heavy seas, however, made him reconsider the practicalities of such future
endeavors. “Next time I’m going to tie my camera on to me to negotiate a transfer like
that, and not trust to luck, as I got two thrills when passing it across the open sea.”146
Wood also enjoyed showing off his collection to friends, as well as photographing
children at play in the navy community.147 Photography certainly afforded the officer a
distraction from his studies, but it likewise added depth to his self-perception.
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Following the London Naval Treaty of 1930, war planners and naval strategists
slowly found their stride and continually tried, with varying success, to fit submarines
into the pre-existing Mahanian doctrine of offensive war. The lack of adequate surface
speed, however, prevented submarine flotillas from sailing alongside the main fleet. As a
compromise, the navy began using the vessels as independent platforms, deployed to
defend a given area of water. Attacking from a defensive position allowed submariners
to prove to their colleagues that they too could threaten enemy surface fleets.148 Slowly,
American submarine commanders became more offensively minded, so much so that the
navy issued a 1934 memorandum that restated the United States’ intentions to adhere to
the rules set forth by the London treaty.149 Specifically, Article 22 of the treaty “rendered
a shark a sitting duck” by forcing submarines to follow the same rules of commerce
warfare as surface vessels – approaching on the surface, giving warning to the vessel,
allowing the merchant sailors to evacuate, and then sinking the ship.150 However,
discussions amongst officers regarding USW had begun to grow serious by the mid1930s. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in 1934, Admiral
George Day warned that “we must be prepared to discover that in war necessity
acknowledges no law.”151 Less than a year later, Lieutenant Hyman Rickover believed
that “it is almost certain that the submarine practices of the World War will be repeated in
a future war.”152 Between 1937 and 1938, Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief
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Asiatic Fleet (CINCAF), continuously advocated a submarine war of “strangulation,”
against the Japanese.153 International law and naval reality were fighting to a stalemate.
As war approached, the need for additional submarine training became
increasingly important to naval authorities. On October 26, 1940, Admiral Harold Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), sent a confidential letter that “requested the BuNav
[Bureau of Navigation] to incorporate into the curriculum of the Submarine School a
short advanced course for P.C.O.’s [Potential Commanding Officers] in attack
technique.”154 Neither Stark nor the BUNAV clearly defined to what end (i.e.
“traditional” versus “unrestricted” warfare) students of the course would use their new
training. The BUNAV’s reply, dated January 6, 1941, authorized the creation of a
month-long course that would “increase knowledge of approach and attack methods by
study and discussions, and technique [gleaned from] actual practice by experienced
submarine officers who are slated to become commanding” or senior officers aboard
submarines.155 Regardless of the specific course curriculum, the development of course
itself was indeed timely. By mid-April 1941, the first P.C.O. class, consisting of four
officers, had graduated.156 Interestingly enough, the next month Stark approved the war
plan titled “Rainbow 5,” allowing, in the event of war, US submarines to establish and
maintain “strategical [sic] areas” of operations throughout Japanese waters in which ships
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could conduct USW.157 Though the correlation between the creation of the P.C.O. course
and the approval of “Rainbow 5” is, at best, circumstantial, it nonetheless made the move
to USW more practical.
While the United States and Japan teetered on the brink of war in 1941, the US
Navy seesawed back and forth between following international treaties and pursuing
commerce raiding vis-à-vis Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. Analysis of the war plan
drafts from March, designated Rainbow Three, suggest that planners had no intention of
using submarines to attack Japanese shipping.158 Yet, only two months later Admiral
Stark’s approval of Rainbow Five and its “strategical areas” created the possibility for
USW.159 In July, four months prior to the official adoption of the “Germany First”
strategy, the navy transferred approximately fifteen percent of the modern submarines
stationed at Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic, leaving twenty-seven of the boats in Admiral
Husband Kimmel’s increasingly cannibalized Pacific Fleet.160 Similarly, the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) reassigned twelve submarines from Task Force
(TF) Seven, Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbor) to Admiral Thomas Hart’s Asiatic Fleet
(Manila) in October.161 From their new location, sub skippers could better serve
Rainbow Five’s plan to scout for the Japanese Combined Fleet near its home waters. In
the same month, the navy continued to issue directives forbidding unrestricted torpedoing
“unless justified by events after the outbreak” of war, meaning that American
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submariners would have to wait for Japan to draw first.162 In early November, the Asiatic
Fleet received an additional eight modern submarines.163 On November 27, 1941,
Admiral Stark, CNO, cabled Admiral Thomas Hart, CINCAF the only known prewar
orders for USW:
If formal war eventuates between U.S. and Japan quote
Instructions for the Navy of the United States governing
Maritime and Aerial Warfare unquote will be placed in
effect but will be supplemented by additional instructions
including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted
submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping…164
Hart trusted that the CNO would make good on his promise. Two hours after the
Japanese surprise attack against the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hart
radioed to the Asiatic Fleet from his Manila headquarters to commence USW.165 Four
hours later, Stark sent out an official message from Washington to “Execute unrestricted
air and submarine warfare against Japan.”166
Despite any mixed intentions prior to Pearl Harbor, early prosecution of the
submarine war against Japan proved that the US Navy had failed to prepare adequately
for USW. As the Japanese invasion forces swept across the South Pacific, submarine
crews attached to the Asiatic Fleet did their best to stem the tide, with limited results. In
the month of March 1942, Asiatic submarines accounted for only two enemy ships sunk –
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one tanker and one aircraft ferry.167 After the fall of Corregidor in early May, the navy
assigned two officers, John Wilkes and Jimmy Fife, to compile a report assessing the
successes and failures of the submarine offensive.168 The news in the report was not
good. The Wilkes-Fife Report estimated that, during the first four months of the war,
submarine commanders had completed seventy-five war patrols, launching one hundred
and thirty-six attacks that sank only thirty-six Japanese vessels.169 The report also
surmised that for every ship sunk, commanders had expended nearly ten torpedoes.
Postwar numbers gathered from captured Japanese documents revealed that the WilkesFife Report was overly optimistic. In truth, submarines only accounted for ten sinkings
during the period, shifting the torpedo-to-sinking ratio to a staggering thirty-to-one.170
The main problem, determined the navy, was overly cautious skippers. Because
submarines operated independently from the fleet, prudent commanders all too often
tucked tail and ran. Rumors about cowardly captains quickly spread throughout the fleet.
Inspired by such tales, torpedo officer Doug Rhymes penned a poem entitled, “The
Fearless Skipper.” Such a skipper, wrote Rhymes, never ran for cover “when everything
is clear.”171
With conversational courage
He talks a fearless fight.
He’s a rough, tough hombre
When nothing is in sight.
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All hazards of navigation
Cause him no loss of sleep.
He cruises along most calmly
In water one mile deep.
His nerves are surely made of steel,
His voice has a confident sound,
And he never gets excited
When danger’s not around.172
Despite a plethora of contemporary theories, the navy had no way of knowing in advance
what kind of skipper any given officer would become.173 Through a painful series of trial
by fire the navy slowly weeded out the ineffective commanders, and the submarine
operations in the Pacific steadily improved.
Just like the country’s navy, the American public entered the war with an
uncertain idea of what it was their submarines would do. The lack of a well-defined
cultural discourse meant that the wartime public needed an effective crash course in the
navy’s wartime use of the vessels. Interwar films about American submarines were few
and far between, and did little to help the audience understand the nature of the United
States Navy. The 1928 film, Submarine, stands out only because of its director – the
legendary Frank Capra.174 Submarine depicted the ships as instruments to complicate
human drama. When two navy friends discover that they both love the same woman,
tensions run high. After one sailor gets trapped in a submarine, his friend must rescue
him, racked with guilt over their argument. John Ford’s own excursion into the
submarine genre, 1930’s Men Without Women, yielded similar results.175 Three years
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later, Hell Below hit theaters as the first true, blue submarine film.176 Director Jack
Conway gave audiences a taste of First World War naval battles, though he stretched the
effectiveness of US submarines during the war. The film’s fictional AL-14 engaged and
sank an enemy destroyer – quite a feat, considering that the real US submarines of the
First World War failed to accomplish as much. Nonetheless, Hell Below at least gave
American audiences a sense of what submarines could do in wartime: honorably fight
enemy warships. Still, cultural apathy for submarines during the Great Depression,
coupled with a ten-year hiatus within the film genre, limited the impact the 1933 film
exerted over cultural perceptions.
In January 1943, just barely a year after the Pearl Harbor attack, Hollywood –
specifically, Twentieth-Century Fox – gave American audiences a much-needed guide
for understanding the role of US submarines in the on-going war. Crash Dive – starring
Tyrone Power, Dana Andrews, and Anne Baxter – combined elements of the interwar
sub-movies into an exciting, though highly propagandistic, wartime drama.177 The film
created a love triangle between Power, Andrews, and Baxter, set against the backdrop of
the New London Submarine Base. Interspersed between romantic moments are the highflying battle and underwater scenes that earned the film a 1943 Academy Award for Best
Special Effects. Director Archie Mayo gave audiences a glimpse of the wartime navy,
incorporating footage of real naval personnel at New London and other bases. For the
admittance fee audiences received 105 minutes of action, adventure, romance, laughter,
and public service announcements.
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The movie began with a scene the audience could easily connect with a popular
memory of the First World War: German U-Boats prowling for innocent victims along
the Atlantic Coast. As a lifeboat full of men, women, and children drift aimlessly across
the ocean, a frail little boy comments that he hears a plane above. The survivors strain to
hear the plane’s engines, only to discover that the noise is, in fact, a flotilla of US PT
Boats. One PT Skipper, Lieutenant Ward Stewart (Tyrone Power), steers his boat toward
the crowd. While preparing to transfer the civilians aboard ship, the sailors spot a
submarine periscope in the distance. Racing to intercept the submerged ship, Stewart
remarks, “Sub’s been stalking that lifeboat trying to knock off a rescue ship. We’ll see
what we can do for him.”178 Stewart and his crew successfully depth charge and sink the
Hun submarine, gaining acclaiming in national newspapers. Upon returning to port,
Stewart receives orders to transfer immediately to New London.
The opening scene with the PT boats battling the U-Boat attached the film to
previous cultural perceptions and began the process of steering the audience toward a
new wartime discourse. Filmmakers used the main character of Lt. Stewart as an onscreen surrogate for the American public. Upon arriving at New London, Stewart reports
to the Commandant’s office, finding instead his Uncle Bob – a navy admiral. While the
two men discuss the events of the opening scene, Stewart brags, “That U-Boat never had
a chance. As a matter of fact, no submarine has much of a chance against those PT
Boats.”179 Stewart’s words serve as reassurance that the US Navy could easily control
the U-Boat menace. As the conversation progresses, the admiral takes pains to point out
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that submariners, at least American submariners, are good men who are much needed for
the war effort, but that there is a serious shortage of trained officers.
The admiral’s comments proved valid in the real world. A December 1939 letter
from the Commander of the Submarine Force to the Bureau of Navigation
“recommended that the Bureau’s policy for transferring previously qualified submarine
men to recommissioned destroyers be discontinued,” as it had bled the service dry.180
The fictional Stewart, for example, had trained as a submariner and served in that branch
of the navy for two years before transferring to the larger “battle wagons” of the fleet.
Despite Uncle Bob’s reasoning, Stewart frankly retorted that “As far as I’m concerned,
it’s no life for a dog…even a sea dog. I’d much rather sink ‘em than sail ‘em any
day.”181 Stewart’s stance represented that of the American public: still not overly warm
to submarines, and in need of some “reeducation.” “Well, my boy,” Uncle Bob
responded to Stewart, and ipso facto the audience, “looks like you’re gonna sail ‘em.”
The young lieutenant furrowed his brow, dropped his shoulders, and let out a sigh of
discontentment, not unlike a child who has just been told to eat his broccoli. Like any
fatherly figure, Uncle Bob smiles and tries to make Stewart understand:
Uncle Bob:
You think I’m tied to my desk in Washington because I
enjoy it? No, sir. I’m serving where I’m needed most, and
you’re being assigned where you’re needed most.

Stewart (slowly shaking his head in acknowledgment):
If I may say so, those PTs are a work of art!
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Uncle Bob:
So are the subs.182
In order to be of use to the war effort, Stewart and the audience had to accept both their
specific roles and the fact the submarines were a vital part of the navy.
The initial appearance of the film’s supporting character, Lieutenant Commander
Dewey Connors (Dana Andrews), served to juxtapose the pristine ideals of Stewart with
the stark realities of submarine warfare. Standing on the New London docks, Connors –
commanding officer of the USS Corsair – talks with the ship’s chief petty officer, both
men frustrated that they have waited weeks for a new executive officer (XO) so that they
could go on patrol.183 A day of manual labor aboard the Corsair had taken its toll on
Connors’s appearance. When the base commandant brings Stewart, slated to become
Connors’s XO, to meet the ship’s captain, the disparity between the two men’s
appearance becomes apparent. Stewart, wearing a clean black uniform with his jacket
pressed and tie straight, stood erect opposite his new commanding officer. The
disheveled Connors, his kaki work uniform wrinkled and dirty with oil smears, fished
through his pockets, coming up with a crushed, empty cigarette pack. Trying to be
friendly, Stewart holds out his gleaming brass cigarette case as an offering to Connors.
Director Archie Mayo let the shot of the two men facing each other linger a moment to
drive home the differences between them – Stewart as the culturally reluctant submariner,
and Connors as the bringer of a dirty reality.
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The contrasting worlds of Stewart and Connors intersect with the movie’s leading
lady, school teacher Jean Hewlett (Anne Baxter), who serves as a conduit for debate
between choosing what is safe versus what is right. Hewlett, a teacher at a New London
boarding school for girls, is the long-time girlfriend and not-quite fiancée of Lt.
Commander Connors. Early in the film, Hewlett takes a small group of her students to
tour the nation’s capital at Washington, D.C. Also headed to the busy wartime hub is
none other than Lt. Stewart, having received weekend leave before reporting to the
Corsair. Hewlett and Stewart have their “meet-cute” aboard the D.C.-bound train.184
After accidentally retiring for the evening in the wrong berth, Stewart is happily surprised
to find a beautiful woman climbing into bed with him. Hewlett, upon discovering the
smiling young Stewart in her bed, is decidedly less-than-thrilled. Once in D.C., Stewart
learns that the tables have turned when he sees Hewlett begging the desk clerk at the
Capitol Hotel for a room.185 The wily lieutenant phones the front desk and tells the clerk
to give Hewlett his own room. Stewart later arrives in his room, faking anger, and
threatens to call a house detective in order to get to the bottom of Hewlett’s “treachery.”
After allowing Hewlett to bat her eyelashes for a while, Stewart relents, “I’m against
appeasement, as a rule, but in this case, I’m willing to discuss a negotiated peace.”
Realizing that she’s been blackmailed into having dinner with the handsome stranger,
Hewlett retorts, “That isn’t gold on your uniform – it’s brass.” In spite of her
reservations, Hewlett spends the night on the town with Stewart, not returning to the hotel
until after 3am.
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Hewlett’s encounters with the devil-may-care Stewart led her to question the
stable life offered by a union with the careful Connors. Back in New London, Hewlett’s
girlfriend refers to Connors as Hewlett’s “Rock of Gibraltar,” and the “rocks” were worth
marrying.186 Connors later tells Hewlett that they can get married after he becomes a
fully-ranked commander, as the additional pay grade would cover both the wedding costs
and “subsequent upkeep.”187 Still fearful of what may happen while waiting for
Connors’s promotion, Hewlett quietly acquiesces to postpone marriage. As the school
teacher waits throughout the movie, she continues to encounter Stewart in New London.
Eventually, the lieutenant wins over the object of his affection, giving her his Naval
Academy class ring as sign of engagement.
Crash Dive’s love triangle serves both to entertain audiences and to promote an
approach to life, and to war, that creates and seizes opportunities for victory. In the
movie’s on-shore world, Stewart’s bull-headed, unrelenting approach – though initially
shocking – proves more capable than Connors’s more traditional, slow-but-steady
courting methods. Each man’s romantic personality spills over into the way with which
he executes his official duties. While on their first patrol aboard the Corsair, the two
men and their crew spend over twenty days slowly combing a small section of the North
Atlantic. The impatient Stewart scoffs that he could sweep through the entirety of the
same sea with a PT Boat in just half the time.188 A few days later, Connors bottoms the
boat to avoid depth charges, opting to play it safe by playing opossum. Again, Stewart

186

Ibid., New London, boarding school scene.

187

Ibid., New London, Officers’ Club scene.

188

Ibid., First Patrol, North Atlantic scene.

63
muses, “If only I were up there in one of those PT Boats.” In an effort to fool the surface
ship, Connors orders the crew to shoot trash through the torpedo tubes and pump fuel into
the sea, creating a false debris field. When Connors hits his head and loses consciousness
after a nearby depth charge explodes, Stewart takes command and makes a daring run for
the surface, torpedoing the enemy warship before it can sink the submarine. Combining
the ideals and tactics embodied by Stewart and Connors, the film suggested, would create
a winning strategy. Later on deck, Connors tells Stewart, “I’m thinking that someday
they’ll make a torpedo [PT] boat that’ll submerge.” “That’s funny you should mention
that, Captain,” Stewart returns, “‘cause I’ve been thinking of a way to make a submarine
go fifty knots.” Like the real submariners in the early months of 1942, the fictional duo
found that daring and tenacity, tempered with a bit caution, yielded winning results.
The film also revealed the importance of the sailors’ cultural identity. According
to the Vernian Model, submarines – and other vessels – assume society’s cultural
perceptions about the men running them. The enemy ship that forced Connors to bottom
the Corsair was a German Q-Ship. The British Navy created the Q-Ship concept during
the First World War by converting merchant ships into heavily armed men-of-war.189
Despite the use of “guile, trickery, and ambush” – words often associated with U-Boats –
Britain praised the efforts Q-Ship commanders and their crews.190 The most celebrated
such commander was Gordon Campbell, responsible for sinking three U-Boats with his
deck guns.191 Fleet Admiral John Jellicoe reported that Campbell had “a record of
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gallantry, endurance and discipline which has never been surpassed afloat or ashore.”192
Ironically, one of Campbell’s gallant methods for tricking U-Boat commanders involved
dressing a member of the crew in women’s clothing and instructing the sailor to carry a
bundle that represented a baby.193 Nonetheless, British Q-Ships received admiration
because they were British. In Crash Dive, the perception of an evil submarine and a
noble Q-Ship reverse to reflect the crews manning each vessel. Such a role reversal
allowed the film to modify and reinforce discourse that placed Americans within
submarines.
As an educational experience for American cultural discourse, Crash Dive
concluded with a review of the lessons the audience needed to remember during the war.
When newly-wedded Stewart and Hewlett pay a visit to Stewart’s grandmother, they find
Uncle Bob at the house as well. Hewlett and the grandmother excuse themselves,
allowing the two navy men a chance to chat about the war effort. Stewart, once again
assuming the role of the American public, begins explaining what his experiences aboard
the Corsair have taught him. In what quickly turns into a Public Service Announcement,
Stewart extols that the various branches of the navy – from submarines and PT Boats to
aircraft carriers and battleships – all have their own jobs to do. Working in concert with
each other, these elements of the modern navy will win the war together.
And it isn’t all ships – it’s men. The men behind the guns
of the PT Boats, and the submarines, and the Coast Guard
ships, and the minelayers, and the tenders, and the tankers,
and the troopships. The men that take them out, that fight
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their way over and land them there. That’s the navy – the
United States Navy!194
Although the movie did not create the perception of Americans manning submarines, it
did encourage the audience to warm to the idea of a weapon with an uncertain wartime
role.
The only other American wartime submarine film served to define the war with
Japan and further complicate the perception of US submarines. Destination Tokyo hit
theaters in 1944, bringing with it a message that the war with Japan was one dominated
by race.195 The film juxtaposed the God-fearing white Americans with the savage yellow
Japanese. The on-screen adaptation of the submarine reconnaissance mission completed
for the Doolittle Raid starred Cary Grant as Captain Cassidy of the USS Copperfin.
Preparing to depart from San Francisco on a secret mission, Cassidy writes to his wife.
On his desk, the captain has three pictures – one each of his wife, daughter, and son –
placed next to a book entitled Racial Theory.196 In his letter, Cassidy tells his wife that
he hopes “the chicken pox didn’t leave any marks on that sweet face” of his daughter.
Throughout the movie, sailors aboard the Copperfin continuously talk about sweethearts,
mom, and apple pie – all the Americana “stuff” for which they fought. En route to the
Aleutian Islands, one sailor boasts that the ship will sink an astounding seventy thousand
tons of enemy shipping. When prodded by his mates as to why he is so optimistic, the
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sailor replies, “Where I go there’s gonna be dead Japs.”197 Later in the Aleutians, the
ship’s cook – who is conspicuously white, instead of black198 – muses while fishing,
“You know, I’d sure like to hook an Aleutian salmon. Cute if I opened him up and there
was a Jap in there. Fried Jap and tartar sauce.” “I’ll take mine boiled in oil,” returns a
nearby sailor.199 Racial slurs permeate the sailors’ dialogue, often times substituting
“Japs” with “Nips” or “Snipes.” Even the Captain fires off the occasional reference to
the “Nips.” Defining the war in such a way allowed filmmakers and audiences alike to
justify and accept the methods that would bring the final victory.
Both Crash Dive and Destination Tokyo alluded to the “identity crisis” noted by
historian Stephanie Cousineau. Crash Dive included a scene in which a portion of the
Corsair’s crew snuck into a secret Nazi base.200 During that point in the movie, the
submariners became commandos and saboteurs. As part of its mission in Destination
Tokyo, the members of the Copperfin’s crew ran reconnaissance operations within Tokyo
Bay and on the Japanese coastline as though they were spies. Additionally, the Copperfin
rescued a Japanese aviator in the Aleutian Islands, similar to its real-life counterparts who
spent many wartime patrols fishing downed Allied pilots out of the Pacific. Finally, both
fictional submarines engaged in more traditional submarine roles: attacking and sinking
enemy warships. While neither film addressed the issue of commerce raiding, they
nonetheless painted the submarine’s strategic role with broad strokes. Additionally, both
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films reinforced the need – under the guise of national security – for “silence.” When the
Copperfin returned from its harrowing adventures in Japanese waters, two men working
on the Golden Gate Bridge spot the submarine. “You think that sub down there saw any
action?” asked one. “Nah,” replied the other, “probably just out for a couple of practice
dives.”201 No matter what submarines actually did – reconnaissance, rescue, sabotage, or
battle – the Americans only needed to nod quietly in appreciation.
While the American public learned to accept the uncertain role of submarines,
submarine commanders and crews likewise learned their craft of commerce raiding. The
slow start of 1942 yielded only 182 Japanese ships sunk.202 As more cautious sub
skippers fell by the wayside and the remaining commanders adopted more practical
approaches to commerce raiding, the American numbers improved. Commenting on the
failed tactics that hampered early attempts at commerce raiding, one submariner recalled
years later:
Say your objective is to contact all the commuters who live
in a town outside New York. The way they went about it
would be comparable to going to each individual commuter
in his home. The most efficient way to find them is not like
that but at the railway station when they’re all bunched
together, trying to get on the same trains.203
US submarines in the Pacific accounted for 135 vessels in 1943.204 1944 proved
disastrous to the Japanese tanker fleet – completely obliterated by the submerged arm of
the US Navy – along with the country’s other lost ships that numbered 603 during the
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year.205 The numbers of sunken ships declined sharply in 1945 due to the fact that the
Japanese merchant and military fleets had all but disappeared. All told, US Submarines
sank nearly five million tons of Japanese commercial vessels and half a million tons of
warships.206 In the words of Theodore Roscoe, “The atomic bomb was the funeral pyre
of an enemy who had been drowned.”207
The death of the Japanese Empire brought with it the death of an ambiguous
American submarine discourse. In the years immediately after 1945, writers – mostly
submariners – took great strides to tell their countrymen about the numerous victories
enjoyed by US submarines during the war. Hollywood leapt on the increased postwar
interest in Second World War seafaring stories, creating a boom in submarine-inspired
movies. As the US Navy slowly divulged the true extent of submarine activities in the
Pacific, it helped replace the discourse about a branch of the military that was formerly
“Silent as the Grave” with one that came to symbolize “The Flagship of Freedom.”
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CHAPTER IV
FLAGSHIP OF FREEDOM
[The George Washington] is, like all nuclear powered
submarines, a true submarine in the sense that it is not
dependent on the earth’s atmosphere for its operation. It,
with its Polaris missile, is the first naval weapon system to
be specifically designed for strategic employment against
land targets and adds an entirely new dimension to our
naval power. Knowing the tremendous destructive
potential of the lethal cargos that will be carried by
submarines, no attacker could hope to escape retribution,
even given the advantage of striking the first blow. ~
Wildred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, at the
launching of USS George Washington, June 1959.208
American submarines of the Cold War had a clearly-defined purpose, generated
by a well-articulated cultural discourse. The submarine service’s previous search for
identity ended as the threat of Soviet nuclear capabilities intersected with technological
innovation and cultural embracing of submarines in the decade following 1945. A
veritable perfect storm had come together by the time that the George Washington put to
sea in mid-1959. First, writers began educating the American public as to the extent of
submarine activities in the Pacific War – most notably Samuel Eliot Morison, Theodore
Roscoe, and Edward L. Beach. Although the popularity of the quasi-official histories
published by Morison and Roscoe paled in comparison with that of Beach’s fictional
writing, each author contributed to the post-war cultural buzz that Hollywood exploited
with its submarine genre movies. One of the twelve 1950s submarine films was MGM’s
on-screen adaptation of Beach’s novel, Run Silent, Run Deep.209 In 1954, the same year
that the Soviet Union detonated its first Hydrogen bomb, the US Navy commissioned its
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first nuclear powered submarine, the not-so-fictional Nautilus.210 By 1957, the Navy had
approved the creation of the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile program – the ultimate
deterrent for checking Soviet aggression.211 Armed with Polaris-type Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), early Cold War US submarines could rain nuclear death and
destruction in the event of a Soviet first strike. All of these elements came together
immediately after the Second World War to create the cultural discourse this study
identifies as The Flagship of Freedom.
The roots of the Retaliatory School’s thesis first appeared with the outbreak of
war in 1941. On December 7th, Admiral Richmond Turner – head of the navy’s war
planning division – commented that, “In retaliation for Japanese bombing of open towns
in Oahu…orders had been given to U.S. Submarines in the Pacific to sink at sight
Japanese merchant ships of all types.”212 When President Franklin Roosevelt addressed
the nation on December 8th, he proclaimed that “No matter how long it may take us to
overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will
win through to absolute victory.”213 Although a few days later Roosevelt assured the
nation that the war was not one of “vengeance,”214 his better-remembered Infamy Speech
nonetheless provided a mandate that allowed for any and all means of victory, including
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. During the Nuremburg trials in 1946, Admiral Chester
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Nimitz, who assumed command of the Pacific Fleet following the Pearl Harbor attack,
submitted an affidavit assuring that the submarine war in the Pacific had been “an act of
reprisal against Japan.”215 The righteous might of justifiable wartime policies and tactics
successfully laid the groundwork for postwar cultural discourse.
The earliest histories of the submarine war mimicked wartime rhetoric by filtering
the memory of USW through the lens of justifiable retaliation. Samuel Eliot Morison –
the father of the Retaliatory School216 – began his 1949 discussion of American
submarines with the acknowledgement that the country had, as a signatory of the London
Naval Treaty, agreed to abide by the pre-existing laws governing commerce raiding by
refraining from USW.217 Before delving into the country’s obvious flouting of
international treaty, Morison provided his readers with a context for such actions.
Treaty and doctrine alike went by the board on the first day
of the war, when the Chief of Naval Operations issued the
terse order, “Execute unrestricted submarine and air
warfare against Japan.” The enemy, by his calculated
breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor, had
absolved the United States from observing any rule
restricting methods of naval warfare unless dictated by selfinterest or the danger of retaliation. After 7 December
1941 combatant ships were still considered prime targets,
but the employment of submarines to lance the arteries of
enemy trade now became of major importance.218
The same year, Theodore Roscoe published his own work on the submarine war, though
his style of writing was harsher than Morison’s. Roscoe’s work begins with chapter
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entitled, “Holocaust at Pearl Harbor,” in which he gave a brief overview of the attack.219
Moving on, the author asserted that “there were to be no merchant ships in the Pacific for
the duration of the war.”220
Armed or not, these merchantmen were in effect combatant
ships. “Transports,” “freighters,” “tankers” were hollow
titles for auxiliaries of war, and it was the realistic duty of
the submarine forces to reduce these ships to hulls as
hollow as their titles. The polite little law book went
overboard.221
Both authors maintained the veneer of justifiability by pointing to the official order for
USW that CNO Stark issued six hours after the attack. As the authors saw it, prior to
December 7, 1941, the United States had no intention of using submarines as commerce
raiders. Intentions, real or perceived, helped guide early postwar memory of the
submarine campaign.
At the outset of the 1950s, Hollywood’s “Decade of the Submarine”222 began and
effectively cornered the market of postwar submarine memory. During these ten years,
audiences had frequent opportunities to experience the on-screen submarine war in the
form of twelve movies dedicated to wartime plots.223 Nearly all of these films had the
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same style of high-tension, fast-paced dramatic storylines.224 Although every submarine
movie in the period helped to join the world of scholarly history with that of popular
memory, the film Run Silent, Run Deep did so more than its comtemporaries.
In 1955, Commander Edward L. Beach published a fictional account of the
underwater Pacific War entitled, Run Silent, Run Deep.225 A veteran of the war, Beach
had served as executive officer aboard the Trigger and Tirante, and in 1945 assumed
command of his own ship, the Piper.226 Beach’s credentials were impeccable: second in
his class at Annapolis (1939), first in his class at New London’s SUBSCOL, successfully
completed over ten war patrols, and known as “one of the outstanding young submariners
of all times.”227 At the beginning of his novel, the author told readers that “the
motivation, events, and action herein set forth are representative of that brave period
between 1941 and 1945 when many of us unwittingly realized our highest purpose in life.
To that extent, and with these qualifications, this book, though fiction, is true.”228 When
executives at MGM released their adaptation of Run Silent, Run Deep in 1958, they gave
audiences a movie saturated with the main theme that dominated the 1950s subgenre of
war films: justified USW executed by courageous submariners.
The director and producers of Run Silent, Run Deep made it clear that US
submarines had operated under orders to sink both Japanese military and merchant ships.
Edwards, Universal International Pictures, 1959; and Up Periscope, directed by Gordon Douglas, Warner
Brothers Pictures, 1959.
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In the film’s opening scene, Commander PJ Richardson (Clark Gable) attacks a Japanese
convoy of merchant ships before an explosion destroys his submarine in turn.229 A year
later, Richardson commands the submarine Nerka and heads back to the same area to find
and sink the enemy destroyer, nicknamed Bungo Pete, believed responsible for the
sinking of four US submarines. Giving the crew a summary of their orders, Richardson
says, “Number one, and I’m sure you’ve heard this many times, sink enemy shipping.”230
Upon arriving in his designated area of operations, Richardson spots a destroyer escorting
a tanker and quickly devises his plan of attack. “We’ll wait until the destroyer passes
clear, then we’ll take on the tanker.”231 After taking out the tanker, the captain turns
straight toward the warship, firing a spread of torpedoes that strikes the ship along the
bow causing it to sink. Toward the movie’s end, the Nerka engages in an underwater
standoff with a Japanese submarine guarding a convoy. The US crew realizes that there
is only one way to win – force the enemy to the surface by attacking the convoy of
merchantmen. The tactic pays off, and the Nerka lives to continue its campaign of
attrition.
While the practice of USW pervades the film’s plot, Run Silent, Run Deep – like
the works of Morison and Roscoe – provided viewers with a context to justify such
tactics. After a failed attempt to defeat Bungo Pete, the Nerka turns toward Pearl Harbor.
Listening to a transmission by Tokyo Rose in which she claims that the submarine sank,
executive officer Jim Bledsoe (Burt Lancaster) finds it odd that she lists the names of the
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crew, even calling one man by a nickname he earned on patrol! A quick investigation
reveals that Japanese fishermen must have gone through the submarine’s overboard trash
and alerted the Imperial Navy to the Nerka’s presence. By including this subplot, the
film made Japanese civilians complicit in military actions and therefore fair game. The
movie built on these images of sneaky Japanese naval tactics with the revelation of how
Bungo Pete had managed to sink the previous four submarines sent into the Bungo
Straits. With the odds stacked against the Americans, audiences could sympathize with
the wartime practice of USW.
Run Silent, Run Deep also addressed the wartime problem of overly-cautious
skippers. As the Nerka heads out on patrol, Richardson subjects the crew to constant
drilling. One night a watchmen spots an enemy submarine off the stern running
perpendicular to their location, but Richardson orders the crew to maintain their course.
Bledsoe warns the captain that the Nerka “hates showing her backside” to the enemy.232
Below decks, the crew debates Richardson’s actions. “That Jap sub and all these drills –
the captain must be runnin’ scared,” worries the cook. Another sailor jokes, “You’re all
confused, my friend. We’re on a drill patrol, here.” Continuing on, he teases that
Richardson plans “to challenge the Japs to a drill. The winner’s gonna get an all-expense
paid honeymoon trip with Tokyo Rose in the Bungo Straits.” Even the officers express
frustration at running from a fight. One man sarcastically exclaims, “Let us pay tribute to
that great motto: caution with safety and safety with caution,” as he raises a glass to the
“drill master.” Privately, Bledsoe confronts Richardson.
It’s one thing to drill a crew for fighting, but when you
duck a Jap sub they wonder why they should break their
backs on drills when the captain has no stomach for
232
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attacking. “What does he want? Obedience? Effeciency?
Or the best drill cowards in the navy?”
In a scene reminiscent of Doug Rhymes’ wartime poem, “The Fearless Skipper,” Run
Silent, Run Deep showed audiences that there was no place in the navy for “drill
cowards.” When taken together, submarine films of the 1950s like Run Silent, Run Deep
used postwar memory to garner support for a new breed of submariners who emerged as
Cold Warriors.
While the American public underwent a decade-long cultural education courtesy
of Hollywood, the navy prepared to unveil its first line of defense against a contemporary
Soviet threat. When the USSR detonated its first Hydrogen bomb in 1954, it brought
with it a renewed fear of nuclear destruction.233 In November 1955, the Department of
Defense ordered a joint Army-Navy project to develop a “fifteen hundred-mile
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)” called Jupiter.234 Because no existing solid
fuels could handle an IRBM payload, Jupiter missiles relied on liquid fuel, making them
large – too large for submarines – and cumbersome.235 In the hopes of mating ballistic
missiles with the newly commissioned nuclear submarines, director of the navy’s Special
Projects Office, Admiral William Rayborn, approved a long-range, solid-fuel missile
system, Polaris, in late 1956.236 Before the navy could officially begin Polaris
development, Rayborn had to gain the approval of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson. In
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a meeting with Wilson, Rayborn illustrated how the move to a solid-fuel missile would
save half a billion dollars in transport cost by requiring fewer ships to move the smaller
weapon. The heretofore unimpressed Defense Secretary perked up and said with a smile,
“You’ve shown me a lot of sexy slides, young man, but that’s the sexiest, that half-billion
dollar saving.”237 By January 1, 1957, the navy had approved the “sexy” Polaris Fleet
Ballistic Missile program.
In order to underscore the strategic importance of Polaris submarines, the navy
broke a long-standing tradition of naming the vessels for marine life. Chief of the Bureau
of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral H.P. Smith announced in October 1958 that, under
White House directive, new submarines would bear the names of “distinguished
Americans who were known for their devotion for [sic] freedom.”238 Commanders James
Osborn, Harold Shear, and William Simms, all veterans of the Pacific submarine war,
would command the George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Theodore Roosevelt,
respectively.239 Additionally, Smith noted, these new submarines would have two
dedicated crews – designated “Gold” and “Blue” – that would enable the ships to stay at
sea longer, with briefer stays in port. As soon as one crew departed, their counterparts
would board the submarine with fresh provisions and redeploy.240 Symbolically, the
message was strong: the nation’s revered forefathers would keep a constant vigil and
protect their descendants during the uncertain days of the Cold War. By 1966, a
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projected total of forty-one Polaris submarines would stand guard over the nation,
earning the nickname, “41 For Freedom.”241
Although the new defenders of freedom met with a favorable response, a 1961
naval directive indicated the fragility of public perception at the dawn of the Polaris age.
In November of that year, historian Samuel Flagg Bemis dropped a bombshell on the
naval community. At the Naval War College, Bemis presented a paper entitled,
“Submarine Warfare in the Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy, 1915-1945,”
in which he revealed that the navy had decided to conduct a campaign of USW weeks,
perhaps months, before the Pearl Harbor attack.242 Bemis’ argument directly attacked the
Retaliatory School’s thesis and undermined the popular memory of the war formed
during the 1950s. The navy blocked any possibility of publication by classifying the
research until 1978. Reluctantly, Bemis hid his work from the world, writing that “It is
not considered in the public interest to publish this study at the present time.”243 The
“time” of which Bemis wrote was indeed a precarious moment in the American
submarines’ history – the George Washington was less than two years old, the navy had
begun receiving installments of the Ethan Allen-class Polaris systems, and thirty-one of
the “41 For Freedom” still required extensive funding. With Bemis’ discovery locked
away, the American public had no reason to question the glorious history of American
submarines in the Pacific War, and ipso facto, in the current Cold War. Building on the
pristine and guarded reputation of this latest generation of submariners, the navy could
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meet unforeseen Soviet threats with continuing advances in submerged warfare that
enjoyed growing popularity among the nation’s citizenry.
As the navy readied the last Polaris submarine for duty in 1966, the Pentagon
began studying its possible replacement. In response to the potential of increasingly
advanced Soviet ICBMs, the two-year study designated “Strat-X” explored a range of
next-generation deterrents, including the Trident ballistic missile.244 Official research
and development of Trident and a platform to carry and deploy it began in 1967. Over a
decade of refinement went into producing the “quietest, fastest, and deadliest ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) in the world.”245 Finally, in 1981, the navy officially received
the duty-ready lead boat of the Trident generation – Ohio.246 By creating yet another
naming precedent with the latest nuclear deterrent, the navy shifted its evocation of
cultural images from America’s past to its present, directly enlisting the country’s
citizenry as Cold Warriors. By the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the navy had
commissioned eleven more Trident submarines – the final two being West Virginia
(1990) and Kentucky (1991). A case study of how West Virginians reacted to news of the
forthcoming submarine reveals broad trends that characterized submarine discourse in the
late Cold War.247
Early efforts to name a nuclear submarine after the Mountain State reveal regional
competition and patriotic yearnings. Within two weeks of the Ohio’s launching, Ruth
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Campbell – mother of Commander Arlie Campbell, Ohio’s Potential Commanding
Officer (PCO) – wrote to her senators, Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd, to ask a
favor.248 In the letter to Randolph, Campbell described the other submarines she had seen
at the launching.249 After noting that work was already underway on the Michigan and
Georgia, the housewife told the senior senator, “Please do use your influence to get the
3rd Trident named the West Virginia – wouldn’t that be wonderful?”250 Randolph’s reply
arrived a few weeks later, bearing the news that he had “written the Secretary of the Navy
and the Chief of Naval Operations to urge that the third Trident submarine be named the
West Virginia.”251 Despite Randolph’s swift actions, the US Navy was slow to move; by
the time the senator retired in 1985, no plans to name a submarine after the state had
materialized. Finally, at the urging of Senator Byrd in 1987, the Secretary of the Navy
agreed to the idea originally put forth by Campbell.252 Byrd called the announcement
“great news. West Virginians have a distinguished history of patriotism and service to
their country, and it is fitting to name this Naval [sic] vessel in honor of our state.”253
Noting that the state ranked first in the number of deaths for both Korea and Vietnam, as
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well as fourth for the Second World War, Byrd concluded that the new submarine
represented “a well-deserved recognition of their sacrifices.”254
Fostering a bond between the vessel and its namesake state became an on-going
task for naval and political leaders, but perhaps the most intimate connection came with
the news that six West Virginians, two officers and four crewmen, would serve aboard
the submarine. Citizens of Hampshire County were “very proud of one sailor that is in
the vessel’s crew,” Kelly J. Jaeger.255 Jaeger, a former “outstanding student and athlete at
Hampshire,” was a missile technician assigned to the West Virginia.256 The Hampshire
County native described the new ship as “a Cadillac of the fleet” that would bear its name
well.257 In a newspaper article, large pictures of the submarine featured prominently
alongside pictures of Jaeger with his wife and baby. Reinforcing the idea of familial
pride, the Hampshire Review observed that Jaeger’s grandmother, Dakota Caldwell,
“beamed with pride last week as she talked of the upcoming events and the chance to see
her grandson once again.”258 West Virginia was more than a pile of high-tech metallurgy;
by serving as the home of actual state natives, West Virginia became West Virginia.
Prior to the christening and commissioning, Captain James Harvey and his crew
took a proactive approach to ensure that their sponsor state formed a close relationship
with the submarine. During Memorial Day weekend of 1989, Harvey and three crewmen
enjoyed a visit to their sponsor city of Wheeling where they were special guests of the
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mayor and American Legion Post One.259 The crew made frequent visits to the state:
spending time at the West Virginia Children’s Home; participating in the Cherry River
Navy Maneuvers at Richwood, WV; whitewater rafting along the New River; serving as
guests at the annual Sternwheel Regatta in Charleston and the Italian Heritage Festival in
Clarksburg. The state’s land-grant school, West Virginia University, hosted a special
Navy Day as part of the West Virginia-South Carolina football game in Morgantown on
September 15, 1989.260 Twenty-five crewmen, along with Admiral Arlie Campbell and
other officers, spent the day as personal guests of University President N.S. Bucklew.
Both the crew and the state’s citizenry did their part to embrace one another as friends
and family. Harvey wrote that his goal was “to better acquaint us about this great state
and its citizens and most importantly acquaint the state’s citizens with their new Trident
Submarine that will inherit the history and the proud name of the previous USS WEST
VIRGINIA (ACR-5) and USS WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48).”261
Harvey may not have realized it at the time, but the history of the West Virginia
(BB-48) was inescapable. The designation BB-48 identified the submarine’s predecessor
as a battleship. On the morning of December 7, 1941 West Virginia sat in the water of
Pearl Harbor, caddy-cornered from the Arizona. Like its sister, West Virginia sank from
damages sustained during the Japanese attack; however, the navy raised and repaired the
ship.
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Like a vengeful ghost reappearing from the dead, the USS
WEST VIRGINIA (BB48) rose from the murky bottom of
Pearl Harbor to unleash a retaliatory fury on the enemy for
a full year preceding the Japanese surrender.262
The navy decorated the battleship with five battle stars for its actions in the Pacific War.
Every year, West Virginia newspapers remind readers of the state’s connection to Pearl
Harbor, keeping the memory of the battleship alive. When news spread about the new
Trident West Virginia, every article referenced the ship’s predecessor and its phoenix-like
story.263 Coverage of the christening ceremony explicitly linked the past and present with
a photograph that showed two veterans from the battleship standing alongside Captain
Harvey and Admiral Campbell.264 Commemorative prints sold at the commissioning
showed the new submarine sailing side-by-side with the battleship.265 The linked
memory of the battleship and the discourse about the submarine made the new West
Virginia the latest defender of freedom.
The memories of the Second World War likewise echoed with the appointment of
the Governor’s Commissioning Committee. West Virginia Governor Gaston Caperton
created the special committee to oversee the logistics of the commissioning ceremony.266
To head up the group, Caperton appointed prominent citizen C.E. “Bert” Goodwin.267
Goodwin hailed from the small West Virginia town of Ripley, a place where, during the
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Depression, young men spent free time playing “kick-the-can at night and
chas[ing]…girls into dark places.”268 When war came to the isolated town in December
1941, Goodwin burst through the doors of the local Episcopal Church shouting, “The
goddamned Japs have bombed Pearl Harbor!”269 Goodwin remembered well the
treachery of “sneaky” tactics and would not have been party to a group promoting an
underhanded weapon. As such, his presence on the committee reveals the changed
perception of submarines. Serving as Goodwin’s co-chair was Hershel “Woody”
Williams, a native born West Virginian and former Marine. During the fighting on Iwo
Jima in 1945 Williams took out several enemy pillboxes single-handedly; for his actions,
Williams received the Medal of Honor.270 As with Goodwin, Williams’ “stamp of
approval” demonstrates that the popular perception of submarines during the period was
one of an honorable vessel that defended freedom.
Throughout the late-1980s, ordinary West Virginians also found ways to leave
their imprint on the history of the new Trident submarine. Across the state, public school
students worked feverishly to design and draw the West Virginia’s logo.271 The design
submitted by sixteen-year-old Jason Barnard, a junior at Washington Irving High School
in Clarksburg, beat out over a thousand other entries in the competition.272 Barnard’s
winning logo featured an eagle clutching a rhododendron flower set against a background
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of mountains. To the artist, the state’s flower represented West Virginia’s beauty and the
eagle embodied freedom.273 On the other end of the state, workers at the family-owned
Casto and Harris book manufacturer in Spencer toiled away to create a special visitor’s
log.274 The log, weighing fourteen pounds and measuring 71”x13”x2.5”, kept four
artisans busy for some twenty hours. With an estimated value of $800-$1000, the
memento boasted five hundred linen pages with hand-sown leather binding and marble
edging. The president of Casto and Harris, Clay Miller III, had the honor of presenting
the log to the ship’s company at the commissioning ceremony.275
Even the flavors of West Virginia found prominent roles at the formal exercises.
Russ Tuckwiller, owner of the Charleston-based restaurant Esquire, oversaw the food
planning for the commissioning in Kings Bay, Georgia.276 The logistics of feeding an
expected five thousand attendees included “dispatching a refrigerated truck with 1,500
pounds of meat including 300 pounds of country ham.”277 Because approximately onefifth of those in attendance would be West Virginians, Tuckwiller wanted to feature state
dishes, including: smoked ham, roast beef, biscuits, rolls, Tuckwiller’s homemade
sausage, sausage from Mama Jarroll’s Country Road Inn (Summersville, WV), West
Virginia-grown apples, brown beans and cornbread, and local Briar Run goat cheese.278
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The all-important christening champagne came from Hampshire County, courtesy of the
West Virginia Grape Growers’ Association.279 Officials at General Dynamics, Electric
Boat Division – the traditional builders of navy submarines – took great pains to ensure
that the special Hampshire bubbly did its job. After enjoying morning coffee on the day
of the christening, ship’s sponsor Erma Byrd took a few practice swings with a wooden
bottle.280 For the actual christening, Mrs. Byrd used a pre-cracked bottle wrapped in a
protective mesh netting. “If by chance the bottle would not break, there is a standby
bottle that will be immediately broken on the ship to insure the Christening has taken
place.”281 The planners left nothing to chance.
Amidst the pomp and circumstance of the christening and commissioning, the
submarine’s mission was clear. Kelly Jaeger agreed with the Hampshire Review’s
observation that the submarine was “part of the first line of defense of our country,”
noting that “that’s our job – to stay at sea and be submerged, undetected, for the largest
amount of time possible.”282 At the ship’s christening, Senator Byrd admonished, “If we
ever were to launch the missiles of the West Virginia, our basic goal, to deter war, would
have failed.”283
The same year of West Virginia’s commissioning (1990), audiences across the
country experienced the beginning of a submarine film revival. In March, executives at
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Paramount Pictures released the much-anticipated on-screen adaptation of Tom Clancy’s
bestseller, The Hunt for Red October.284 When a new Soviet submarine called Red
October puts to sea in 1984, CIA analyst Jack Ryan (Alec Baldwin) rushes to ascertain
the purpose of the mysterious doors located at the ship’s bow and stern. Shortly after
learning that the doors house a nearly-silent propulsion system that would render it
capable of thwarting the country’s first-warning systems, Ryan finds himself giving a
top-secret briefing to the president’s National Security Advisor Jeffrey Pelt (Richard
Jordan). Acting on intelligence that the ship’s captain, Marko Ramius (Sean Connery),
has gone rogue and intends to fire his ballistic missiles at the United States, the joint
chiefs at the meeting decide they must protect their shores at all costs. Ryan offers an
alternative scenario – Ramius could be defecting! Secretly, NSA Pelt orders Ryan into
the field, giving him forty-eight hours to prove his theory and intercept the Red October
before the Soviet fleet could do the same. The movie took audiences through an actionpacked race against time that helped bridge the gap between submarine discourse and
late-Cold War reality.
The Hunt for Red October brought with it a message of peace to an America that
had endured forty long years of the Cold War. While Ryan and retired submariner Skip
Tyler (Jeffrey Jones) discuss the implications of Red October’s silent capabilities, Tyler’s
character invokes past and present fears of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
When I was twelve, I helped my daddy build a bomb
shelter in our basement because some fool parked a dozen
warheads ninety miles off the coast of Florida. This thing
could park a couple a hundred warheads off Washington or
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New York, and no one would know anything about it till it
was all over.285
The memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the senselessness of nuclear war are
evident in Tyler’s words. After Ryan classifies Red October as a potential first-strike
weapon, an older admiral on the Joint Chiefs of Staff hangs his head saying, “Goddamned thing’s made to start a war.”286 The admiral’s age suggests that he had lived
through previous war(s) and was fearful of a new one characterized by the use of nuclear
weapons. Aboard the aircraft carrier Enterprise, Admiral Painter (Fred Thompson)
assesses the dangers of having the American and Soviet fleets in close proximity to one
another. “This business will get out of control. It will get out of control, and we’ll be
lucky to live through it.”287 The film placed the precarious nature of living in a MAD
world in the foreground of Cold War submarine discourse.
Sean Connery’s portrayal of Captain Marko Ramius similarly invoked the
perception that the arms race had long since grown futile and perilous. Ramius tells his
crew that they play “a dangerous game – a game of chess against our old adversary, the
American Navy.”288 Privately, Ramius’ executive officer and co-defector Vasili Borodin
(Sam Neil) talks with the captain about his ambitions for living a free life in America.
When Borodin asks the captain about his future plans in their new home, Ramius thinks
for a minute before quietly replying:
I miss the peace of fishing – like when I was a boy. Forty
years I’ve been at sea. A war at sea. A war with no battles,
285

Ibid., Dry Docks scene.

286

Ibid., NSA Briefing scene.

287

Ibid., Enterprise Flight Deck scene.

288

Ibid., Sailing Orders scene.

89
no monuments – only casualties. I widowed her the day I
married her. My wife died while I was at sea, you
know?289
Ramius’ description of his war at sea, representing the larger Cold War, painted a dark
picture of a war that was devoid of all recognizable symbols, save for the dead. At the
movie’s end, Ramius finally reveals to Ryan his reasons for defecting. According to the
captain, there were individuals in Russia who believed that the only way to settle tensions
with America was with a massive attack – “Red October was built for that purpose.”290
In messianic fashion, Ramius sacrificed his life, career, and homeland to save the world
from absolute destruction.
Despite Red October’s strong message of peace, it also reinforced the dominant
cultural perception of American submarines as the country’s first line of defense. In the
film, American submarine USS Dallas291 first detects Red October coming out of port.
When the Soviet submarine’s crew activates their new propulsion system, sonar
equipment aboard the Dallas loses the ability to track Red October. After spending hours
filtering through sea-generated sound, sonar technician Seaman Jones (Courtney Vance)
figures out how to track the untraceable submarine. Jones’ determination and good ole
American know-how prove smarter than high-tech sonar gear, and he also correctly
anticipates Red October’s course. The fictional Seaman Jones represented real American
submariners whose technical skills and abilities to adapt, overcome, and improvise
guarded the country’s spheres of influence. Later, when Ryan and a few members of
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Dallas’s crew board the Red October, they come under torpedo attack from another
Soviet submarine, the Konovalov. While Ryan and Ramius search for a saboteur, Dallas
Captain Bart Mancuso (Scott Glenn) takes command of Red October. Having no way to
fire his torpedoes, Mancuso must beat the Konovalov with grit and nerves of steel alone.
Although the ensuing undersea battle was less far-fetched than Chuck Norris roundhousing Vietnam into submission, the point was clear – give an American a free hand,
and he will find a way to win.
American submarines of the Cold War were the right weapons, at the right time,
under the right conditions. Postwar scholarship and popular memory – joined together by
Theodore Roscoe, Edward Beach, and Hollywood – created an historical precedent of
honorable American submarines and submariners. Nuclear proliferation and the potential
for mutually assured destruction provided a niche for advanced submarine technologies.
As the navy’s censorship of Samuel Flagg Bemis protected the submarine’s fragile
reputation in the early 1960s, so too the symbolic joining of Trident submarines with
states’ names in the latter years of the Cold War ensured that American submarines
continued to enjoy an illustrious reputation. But ultimately, the golden age of the
submarine could not endure without a purpose.
The commissioning of the West Virginia and the production of The Hunt for Red
October marked the last years of The Flagship of Freedom. With the official dissolution
of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 came a cultural uncertainty that chipped away at
the clearly-defined discourse birthed by the Cold War and the threat of nuclear attack.
The submarine revival in Hollywood initiated by Red October continued throughout the
1990s and into the early 2000s, but it also revealed a diverse cultural perception of
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submarines. Unlike the decade of the submarine during the 1950s, this new interest in
the vessels included a wide array of films that were serious, comedic, historically-based,
and fantastic. For example, the 1996 comedy Down Periscope directly juxtaposed – in
both title and content – the more straight-forward Second World War-based film Up
Periscope from 1959.292 Much like the interwar and Second World War periods, the
post-Cold War years initiated a search for identity. Without a clearly defined threat,
submarines lost their purpose.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The historian has no crystal ball. As he approaches the
cresting edge of history’s wave, he must fall silent.
~ Paul Boyer, 1985293
The cultural discourse about and the historical realities of American submarine
warfare did not occur in a vacuum. Although this particular study does have a definite
beginning and end, the historical phenomenon explored herein does not. For centuries
prior to the First World War, humanity gazed across the surface of the sea and wondered
what lies beneath. And indeed, it is farcical to presume that the human fascination with
the earth’s oceans will magically cease at some distant point in the future. But what
makes the American cultural experience with submarines in the twentieth century so
fascinating is the fluidity and flexibility shown by both public perceptions and official
policy making. Americans saw no inherent contradiction in reprimanding Germany for
its use of USW and then adopting the same practice some twenty years later. In large
part, the difference between First World War abhorrence and Second World War
acquiescence derived from perceptions about the men inside submarines – evil Germans
versus noble Americans. Yet in the Cold War, quiet acceptance turned to exuberant
acclamation as submarines held the key to maintaining some measure of world peace, at
least when it came to preventing the absolute destruction promised by nuclear holocaust.
Instead of mere changes in political and military policies and doctrines, the moves from
victims to users to noble defenders represent dramatic cultural shifts that took years, if
not decades, to form.
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Even today, the public perception and strategic role of American submarines
continue to evolve. Since the end of the Cold War, the navy has retro-fitted four of the
original Ohio-class Trident submarines with cruise missiles for use in strategic air strikes,
such as the recent 2011 Libyan Civil War. Continued nuclear proliferation and everstraining relations with countries like North Korea and Iran, however, have also allowed
true Trident submarines like the West Virginia to partially resume Cold War roles of
deterrence. While the submarine’s story cannot definitively predict the future of weapons
development and deployment, it does reveal the importance of cultural influences on war
making. And, to a point, the history of American submarines illustrates how the need for
national security during wartime (e.g., the secrecy of the Silent Service) can spill over
into the postwar world, railroading intellectual freedom to protect public opinion of new
weapons (e.g., Bemis’ censorship and deployment of Polaris submarines).
Military applications of submarines, however, only tell part of the story. The
dream of submerged vehicles did not begin, nor will it end, with the desire to fashion new
weapons of war. One only needs to turn on a television in today’s world to find examples
of the scientific advances brought about by modern submarines. The Discovery Channel,
Animal Planet, the History Channel, and Public Broadcasting networks all air programs
in which scientists explore the deep in privately-owned one- or two-man submersibles.
Documentaries about Robert Ballard’s discovery of the Titanic shipwreck, or even
Hollywood’s fictional love story Titanic, all reinforce the wondrous potential of undersea
exploration. Jules Verne’s Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea has been the subject
of five full-length films bearing the same name, not to mention that Captain Nemo and
Nautilus have appeared in at least four other films. Popular culture often likens traveling
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underwater in a submarine to the experience of “sailing” through deep space. Even
weapons aboard the Starship Enterprise bear the names of their submerged counterparts –
torpedoes. These are all examples of current cultural outlets for submarine discourse.
While cultural discourse about, as well as that permeated by submarines continues, the
on-the-ground reactions to that discourse will only become visible in the decades to
come. When that happens, the newly dominant cultural identity will become part of the
larger historical trend that gave birth to preceding perceptions of submarines, and the
process will continue indefinitely.
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